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Data made available annually pursuant to the Home
MortgageDisclosureActof 1975(HMDA)providean
opportunity to explore changes in mortgage market
activity along a host of dimensions.1 HMDA requires
mostmortgagelendinginstitutionswithofficesinmet 




home mortgages that lenders originate or purchase
duringthecalendaryear;loanpricinginformation;the
census tract designation of the properties related to
these loans; personal demographic and other informa 
tion about the borrowers; and information about loan
sales.2Thedisclosuresareusedtohelpthepublicdeter 
mine whether institutions are adequately serving their
communities’ housing finance needs, to facilitate en 
forcement of the nation’s fair lending laws, and to
inform investment in both the public and private sec 
tors. The data have also proven to be valuable as a
research tool, providing insights in many fields of
interest.
The Federal Reserve Board currently implements
the provisions of HMDA through regulation.3 The
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
(FFIEC) is responsible for collecting the HMDA data
and facilitating public access to the information.4 In
September, the FFIEC releases summary tables per 
taining to lending activity from the previous calendar
year for each reporting lender and aggregations of
home lending activity for each metropolitan statistical
area(MSA)andforthenationasawhole.5TheFFIEC
also makes available to the public an application level
data file containing virtually all of the reported infor 
mation for each lending institution.6
The 2009 HMDA data consist of information re 
portedbymorethan8,100homelenders,includingthe
nation’s largest mortgage originators, and thus are
broadlyrepresentativeof allsuchlendingintheUnited
States. The regulations that implement HMDA have
been essentially unchanged since 2002, with one no 
table exception. The rules related to the reporting of
pricing data under HMDA were revised in 2008. The
new procedures affect whether or not a loan is classi 
fied as higher priced starting with applications taken
onOctober1,2009.Thus,the2009HMDAdatareflect
twodifferentloanpricingclassificationrules,although,
for the majority of the year and for most loans origi 
natedin2009,theolderrulesapplied.Theeffectsof the
rule change on reported higher priced lending are ex 
plored in some depth in this article.
1. A brief history of HMDA is available at Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, “History of HMDA,” webpage,
www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history2.htm.
2. Alistof theitemsreportedunderHMDAisprovidedinappen 
dix A.
3. HMDA is implemented by Regulation C (12 C.F.R. pt. 203) of
the Federal Reserve Board. Information about the regulation is
available at www.federalreserve.gov.
4. The FFIEC (www.ffiec.gov) was established by federal law in
1979 as an interagency body to prescribe uniform examination pro 
cedures, and to promote uniform supervision, among the federal
agencies responsible for the examination and supervision of finan 
cial institutions. The member agencies are the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor 
poration, the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
and representatives from state bank supervisory agencies.
5. For the 2009 data, the FFIEC prepared and made available to
thepublic48,563MSA specificHMDAreportsonbehalf of report 
ing institutions. The FFIEC also makes available to the public
reports about private mortgage insurance (PMI) activity. All the
HMDA and PMI reports are available on the FFIEC’s reports
website at www.ffiec.gov/reports.htm.
6. The only reported items not included in the data made avail 
able to the public are the loan application number, the date of the
application, and the date on which action was taken on the applica 
tion. Those items are withheld to help ensure that the individuals
involved in the application cannot be identified.
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This article offers a summary and preliminary analysis
of the 2009 HMDA data. The results of our analysis
reveal the following about mortgage lending in 2009:
v Aftersubstantialdeclinesinloanvolumein2007and
2008,overallloanvolumereboundedin2009,though
it remained well below the levels observed in the
middle of the decade. This increase obscures diver 
gent trends. While refinance activity increased
sharply, likely as a result of historically low interest
rates,home purchaselendingcontinuedtodeclinein
2009.
v The increase in refinancing activity in 2009 appears
tohavebeensomewhatsubduedcomparedwithwhat
has historically been observed when mortgage rates
sharply decline. Evidence presented in this article
suggests that the more muted growth stems from
several factors, including economic distress and low
or negative equity among many households that
could have benefited from lower rates.
v The decline in home purchase lending could have
been more dramatic were it not for first time home 
buyers. Those homebuyers benefited not only from
certain market conditions such as historically low
interestratesandfallinghouseprices,butalsofroma
federaltaxcredit of $8,000and the fact that theydid
not need to sell a house in a depressed economic
environment.
v The percentage of home purchase borrowers classi 
fied as lower income under HMDA rose signifi 
cantlyin2009butdidnotriseintherefinancemarket.
Lower income home purchase borrowers were also
disproportionately likely to take out Federal Hous 
ing Administration (FHA) or Department of Veter 
ans Affairs (VA) loans.
v The substantial growth in the portion of new home
mortgages that were backed by the FHA, VA, or
federal farm programs during 2008 continued in
2009,withsuchloansaccountingfor54percentof all
home purchase lending. One factor likely playing a
roleinthisgrowthisthepullbackbythegovernment 
sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—and private mortgage insurers from
the high loan to value (LTV) ratio market.
v An analysis of the HMDA pricing data in 2009 is
complicated by the steepening yield curve and the
transitiontonewHMDAreportingrulesforpricing.
Comparisons of pricing outcomes across racial and
ethnic groups are particularly problematic for this
reason.Nevertheless,thedataappeartoindicatethat
high risklendingactivityremainedatverylowlevels
during 2009, with no indication of a rebound.
v Lending activity in census tracts with high foreclo 
sure activity has declined more than in other neigh 
borhoods. This decline has been particularly severe
for refinance lending. Declines in home purchase
lending in high foreclosure tracts have been similar
tothoseobservedforothertractsinthesameMSAs.
v Denialratedifferencesacrossracialandethnicgroups
persist, although the HMDA data do not include
sufficient information to determine the extent to
which these differences stem from illegal discrimina 
tion.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2009 HMDA DATA
HMDA covers most mortgage lending institutions,
including all of the largest lenders. From the inception
of HMDA, depository institutions have constituted
1. Distribution of reporters covered by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, by type of institution, 2000–09
Number
Year





institution Credit union All Independent Affiliated
1 All
2000 ........... 3,609 1,112 1,691 6,412 981 332 1,313 7,725
2001 ........... 3,578 1,108 1,714 6,400 962 290 1,252 7,652
2002 ........... 3,628 1,070 1,799 6,497 986 310 1,296 7,793
2003 ........... 3,642 1,033 1,903 6,578 1,171 382 1,553 8,131
2004 ........... 3,945 1,017 2,030 6,992 1,317 544 1,861 8,853
2005 ........... 3,904 974 2,047 6,925 1,341 582 1,923 8,848
2006 ........... 3,900 946 2,037 6,883 1,334 685 2,019 8,902
2007 ........... 3,918 929 2,019 6,866 1,132 638 1,770 8,636
2008 ........... 3,942 913 2,026 6,881 957 550 1,507 8,388
2009 ........... 3,925 879 2,017 6,821 914 389 1,303 8,124
NOTE: Here and in all subsequent tables, components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
1. Subsidiary of a depository institution or an affiliate of a bank holding company.
SOURCE: Here and in subsequent tables and figures except as noted, Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, data reported under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (www.ffiec.gov/hmda).
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tutions reported on their home lending activity under
HMDA: 3,925 commercial banks; 879 savings institu 
tions (savings and loans and savings banks); 2,017
credit unions; and 1,303 mortgage companies, 914 of
which were not affiliated with a banking institution
(table 1).7 The number of reporting institutions has
fluctuated over the years, in part reflecting changes in
reportingrequirements,includingincreasesinthemini 
mum asset level used to determine coverage.8 Changes
in the number and geographic footprint of metropoli 
tanareasalsoinfluencereportingovertime,asHMDA’s
coveragefocusesoninstitutionswithatleastoneoffice
in a metropolitan area.9 Finally, mergers and acquisi 
tions, along with changes in economic conditions that
at times have resulted in more bank failures or new
start ups, have affected the number of reporters. For
2009,thenumberof reportersfell3percentfrom2008,
continuingadownwardtrendsince2006.Independent
mortgage companies experienced the largest percent 
age decline in 2009, falling nearly 14 percent. Since
2006,thenumberof mortgagecompanieshasfallenby
more than one third.
Reportinglenderssubmittedinformationon15mil 
lion applications for home loans of all types in 2009
(excluding requests for preapprovals and purchased
loans),upabout6percentfrom2008butstillfarbelow
the 27.5 million applications reached in 2006, just
before the housing market began unraveling (data de 
rived from table 2.A). The majority of loan applica 
tions are approved by lenders, and most of these
approvals result in extensions of credit. Some applica 
tions are approved, but the applicant decides not to
takeouttheloan;forexample,in2009nearly6percent
of all applications were approved but not accepted by
theapplicant(datanotshownintables).Overall,of the
nearly 15 million applications submitted in 2009,
60 percent resulted in an extension of credit (data
derived from tables 2.A and 2.B).
The HMDA data also include information on loan
purchases by lenders, although the purchased loans
may have been originated at any point in time. For
2009, lenders reported information on nearly 4.3 mil 
lion loans that they had purchased from other institu 
tions, a sharp rebound from the nearly decade low
volume reported in 2008. Finally, lenders reported on
roughly 209,000 requests for preapprovals of home 
purchaseloansthatdidnotresultinaloanorigination
(table 2.A); preapprovals that resulted in a loan are
included in the count of loan extensions noted earlier.
7. Thedatausedinthisarticlefortheyears1990to2007arebased
on revised HMDA filings, which include corrections to the initial
public release. Consequently, figures for these years may not corre 
spondexactlytofiguresintablesof earlierarticles.Thedatafor2008
and 2009 reflect the initial public release.
8. For the 2010 reporting year covering the 2009 data, the mini 
mum asset size for purposes of coverage was $39 million. The mini 
mum asset size changes from year to year with changes in the
Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Work 
ers. See the FFIEC’s guide to HMDA reporting at www.ffiec.gov/
hmda/guide.htm.
9. From time to time, the Office of Management and Budget
updatesthelistandgeographicscopeof metropolitanandmicropo 
litan statistical areas. See Office of Management and Budget, “Sta 
tistical Programs and Standards,” webpage, www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/inforeg_statpolicy.
2. Home loan activity of lending institutions covered under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 2000–09
A. Applications, requests for preapproval, and purchased loans
Number
Year
Applications received for home loans, by type of property
Requests for
preapproval
1 Purchased loans Total 1−4 family
Multifamily
Home purchase Refinance Home
improvement
2000 ............. 8,278,219 6,543,665 1,991,686 37,765 n.a. 2,398,292 19,249,627
2001 ............. 7,692,870 14,284,988 1,849,489 48,416 n.a. 3,767,331 27,643,094
2002 ............. 7,406,374 17,491,627 1,529,347 53,231 n.a. 4,829,706 31,310,285
2003 ............. 8,179,633 24,602,536 1,508,387 58,940 n.a. 7,229,635 41,579,131
2004 ............. 9,792,324 16,072,102 2,202,744 61,895 332,054 5,146,617 33,607,736
2005 ............. 11,672,852 15,898,346 2,539,158 57,668 396,686 5,874,447 36,439,157
2006 ............. 10,928,866 14,045,961 2,480,827 52,220 411,134 6,236,352 34,155,360
2007 ............. 7,609,143 11,566,182 2,218,224 54,230 432,883 4,821,430 26,702,092
2008 ............. 5,017,998 7,729,143 1,404,008 42,792 275,808 2,921,821 17,391,570
2009 ............. 4,201,057 9,935,678 826,916 26,257 209,055 4,294,528 19,493,491
NOTE: Here and in subsequent tables, except as noted, data include first and junior liens, site built and manufactured homes, and owner  and non owner 
occupied loans.
1. Consists of requests for preapproval that were denied by the lender or were accepted by the lender but not acted upon by the borrower. In this article,
applications are defined as being for a loan on a specific property; they are thus distinct from requests for preapproval, which are not related to a specific property.
Information on preapproval requests was not required to be reported before 2004.
n.a. Not available.
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A monthly count of home purchase and refinance
loan originations for one  to four family homes in the
HMDA data shows a downward trend in home 
purchase lending from 2006 to 2009 (figure 1).10 For
instance, in June 2006, the peak month for home 
purchase lending that year, about 698,000 home 
purchase loans were extended, compared with only
308,000 such loans in the peak month of 2008 and
285,000 at the monthly high point for 2009. Overall,
the number of home purchase loans reported by lend 
ers covered by HMDA was down about 11 percent
from 2008 and was nearly 60 percent lower than in
2006 (data derived from table 2.B).
The volume of refinance lending tends to be more
closely aligned with changes in interest rates than that
of home purchase lending, expanding when mortgage
rates fall and retrenching when rates rise. The interest
rate environment in 2009 was quite favorable for bor 
rowers, and the number of reported refinance loans
increased 67 percent from 2008 to 2009 (table 2.B).
However, factors such as elevated unemployment, de 
pressed home prices, and tighter underwriting appear
to have hampered refinance activity, as discussed in
more detail later.
Non-Owner-Occupied Lending
Individuals buying homes either for investment pur 
poses or as second or vacation homes have been an
important segment of the housing market for many
years. Under HMDA, housing units used in such ways
are collectively described and reported as non owner
occupied.11 Between 2000 and 2005, the share of non 
owner occupiedlendingusedtopurchaseone tofour 
family homes rose, increasing over this period to
16 percent from about 9 percent (data derived from
10. Lenders report the date on which action on an application is
taken.Fororiginations,the“actiontaken”dateistheclosingdateor
date of loan origination for the loan. This date is the one we use to
compile data at the monthly level. To help ensure the anonymity of
thedata,thedatesof applicationandactiontakenarenotreleasedin
the HMDA data files made available to the public.
The estimated annual percentage rates (APRs) in figure 1 are
derived from information on contract rates and points from Freddie
Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey. Loan counts are aggre 
gated to the monthly level using the date of loan origination, as
opposed to the potentially earlier date when the interest rate for the
loan was set, which is not reported under HMDA.
11. An investment property is a non owner occupied dwelling
that is intended to be rented or resold for a profit. Some non owner 
occupied units—vacation homes and second homes—are for the
primary use of the owners and thus would not be considered invest 
ment properties. The HMDA data do not, however, distinguish
between these two types of non owner occupied dwellings.




Loans, by type of property
Total 1−4 family
Multifamily
Home purchase Refinance Home improvement
2000.................... 4,787,356 2,435,420 892,587 27,305 8,142,668
2001.................... 4,938,809 7,889,186 828,820 35,557 13,692,372
2002.................... 5,124,767 10,309,971 712,123 41,480 16,188,341
2003.................... 5,596,292 15,124,761 678,507 48,437 21,447,997
2004.................... 6,429,988 7,583,928 966,484 48,150 15,028,550
2005.................... 7,382,012 7,101,649 1,093,191 45,091 15,621,943
2006.................... 6,740,322 6,091,242 1,139,731 39,967 14,011,262
2007.................... 4,663,267 4,817,875 957,912 41,053 10,480,107
2008.................... 3,119,692 3,457,774 568,287 31,509 7,177,262






1.   Volume of home-purchase and refinance originations and  











2009 2008 2007 2006
APR
(right scale)
NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first- and second-lien mortgages
excluding multifamily housing. Annual percentage rate (APR) is the average
monthly rate for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage from the Freddie Mac Primary
Mortgage Market Survey, as reported by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, www.ffiec.gov/ratespread/newcalc.aspx. 
A42 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010table 3, panel A). Since 2005, the share has fallen,
dropping to about 11 percent in 2009.
Types of Loans
Whilethetotalnumberof loanstopurchasehomeshas
fallen sharply since near the middle of the decade, the
volume of nonconventional home purchase loans—
including loans backed by FHA insurance, VA loan
guarantees, and, to a lesser extent, Rural Housing Ser 
vice(RHS)guaranteesandguaranteedanddirectloans
from the Farm Service Agency (FSA)—has increased
markedly, particularly since 2007 (table 3, panel A).
From 2006 to 2009, the total number of reported
home purchase loans for owner occupied homes fell
56 percent, while the number of nonconventional
home purchase loans of this sort more than tripled.
Nonconventional lending has also garnered a larger
share of the refinance market since 2007, although
conventional loans used for refinancing still outnum 
ber nonconventional loans (table 3, panel B). In 2006,
therewere44conventionalloansusedfortherefinanc 
ing of loans secured by owner occupied homes for
everynonconventionalloan;in2009,theratiowas5to
1. We discuss these developments in more detail in the
later section “The Changing Role of Government in
the Mortgage Market.”
The sharp increase in nonconventional lending for
home purchase relates almost exclusively to site built
homes. In fact, the volume of loans, whether noncon 
ventional or conventional, to purchase manufactured
homes has fallen every year since 2006, and such lend 
ing represents a small fraction (less than 3 percent in





Owner occupied Non owner occupied Owner occupied Non owner occupied
Conventional Non 
conventional
1 Conventional Non 
conventional
1 Conventional Non 
conventional




2000 ........... 6,350,643 1,311,101 604,919 12,524 3,411,887 963,345 404,133 8,378
2001 ........... 5,776,767 1,268,885 627,598 19,688 3,480,441 1,003,795 440,498 14,128
2002 ........... 5,511,048 1,133,770 747,758 13,923 3,967,834 870,599 547,963 8,474
2003 ........... 6,212,915 1,014,865 943,248 8,623 4,162,412 761,716 667,613 4,560
2004 ........... 7,651,113 799,131 1,335,241 6,839 4,946,423 574,841 906,014 2,710
2005 ........... 9,208,214 610,650 1,850,174 3,814 5,742,377 438,419 1,199,509 1,707
2006 ........... 8,695,877 576,043 1,653,154 3,792 5,281,485 416,744 1,040,668 1,425
2007 ........... 5,960,571 599,637 1,044,112 4,823 3,582,949 423,506 655,916 896
2008 ........... 2,940,059 1,424,483 647,340 6,116 1,727,692 972,605 415,930 3,465
2009 ........... 1,883,278 1,884,136 427,338 6,305 1,171,033 1,320,412 289,796 3,715
B. Refinance
2000 ........... 6,051,484 110,380 379,299 2,502 2,170,162 64,882 198,695 1,293
2001 ........... 12,737,863 705,784 823,748 17,592 6,836,106 524,228 516,616 12,181
2002 ........... 15,623,327 742,208 1,111,588 14,504 9,058,654 535,370 706,570 9,377
2003 ........... 21,779,329 1,236,467 1,563,430 23,310 13,205,472 895,735 1,007,674 15,871
2004 ........... 14,476,350 497,700 1,084,536 13,516 6,649,588 304,591 621,667 8,082
2005 ........... 14,494,441 262,438 1,135,929 5,538 6,336,004 158,474 603,914 3,257
2006 ........... 12,722,112 208,405 1,112,891 2,553 5,382,950 122,134 585,142 1,016
2007 ........... 10,173,282 375,860 1,012,827 4,213 4,123,507 196,897 496,577 894
2008 ........... 5,829,633 1,240,472 650,042 8,996 2,593,793 522,243 337,914 3,824
2009 ........... 7,251,066 2,051,766 617,707 15,139 4,404,215 998,585 348,599 7,476
C. Home improvement
2000 ........... 1,833,277 91,575 65,286 1,548 843,884 10,896 37,047 760
2001 ........... 1,771,472 16,276 60,598 1,143 788,560 6,722 32,990 548
2002 ........... 1,459,049 11,582 58,080 636 676,515 4,878 30,533 197
2003 ........... 1,430,380 13,876 63,806 325 642,065 5,226 31,113 103
2004 ........... 2,081,528 11,887 109,105 224 904,492 5,557 56,341 94
2005 ........... 2,401,030 10,053 127,857 218 1,026,340 4,483 62,298 70
2006 ........... 2,335,338 12,645 132,694 150 1,067,730 6,115 65,842 44
2007 ........... 2,072,688 16,717 128,700 119 887,123 9,409 61,321 59
2008 ........... 1,294,162 26,544 83,036 266 516,612 12,347 39,170 158
2009 ........... 740,061 28,437 58,171 247 348,409 11,212 28,183 166
1.LoansinsuredbytheFederalHousingAdministrationorbackedbyguaranteesfromtheU.S.Departmentof VeteransAffairs,theFarmServiceAgency,orthe
Rural Housing Service.
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from tables 2.B and 4).
Junior-Lien Lending
InformationonlienstatusreportedintheHMDAdata
differentiates among loans secured by a first lien, se 
cured by a subordinate (junior) lien, and not secured.
(The latter arises only among home improvement
loans,forwhichasecurityinterestinapropertymayor
may not be taken). Home equity lines of credit (both
first and junior liens) are generally not reported under
HMDA. Other junior liens are reported only if they
are used for home purchase, home improvement, or a
refinancing of a previous loan, which means, in prac 
tice, that only junior liens used for home purchase are
comprehensively reported in HMDA. In the recent
past,oneimportantpurposeof homepurchasejunior 
lien loans was to avoid paying for either private mort 
gage insurance (PMI) or government mortgage
insurance when purchasing a home. By taking out a
junior lien loan (often referred to as a “piggyback”
loan) to accompany the primary mortgage, homebuy 
ers were able to finance the down payment. In 2006,
HMDA reporters extended nearly 1.3 million junior 
lienloansforthepurposeof buyinganowner occupied
home (table 5, panel A). The number of such loans fell
bymorethanone half in2007andfellsharplyagainin
2008. In 2009, only about 44,000 such loans were
extended by HMDA reporters.
Loan Sales
The HMDA data include information on the type of
purchaserforloansthatareoriginatedandsoldduring
the year. The data are one of the few sources of infor 
mation that provide a fairly comprehensive record of
whereloansareplacedafterorigination.Becausesome
loans originated during a calendar year are sold after
theendof theyear,theHMDAdatatendtounderstate
theproportionof originationsthatareeventuallysold,
an issue we deal with in more detail in the later section




Broadly, these purchaser types can be broken into
those that are government related—Ginnie Mae, Fan 
nie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Farmer Mac—and those
that are not.12 Ginnie Mae and Farmer Mac are fo 
12. Technically, Ginnie Mae does not buy or sell loans; rather, it
guarantees that investors receive timely payment of interest and
principal for mortgage backed securities backed by FHA or VA
loans. However, the HMDA rules direct lenders to report loans
covered by Ginnie Mae guarantees as sales to Ginnie Mae. (See the
GinnieMaewebsiteatwww.ginniemae.gov.)FarmerMacpurchases
4. Loans on manufactured homes, by occupancy status of home and type of loan, 2004–09
Number
Year





2004 ......................... 107,686 23,974 16,243 125
2005 ......................... 101,539 27,229 17,927 56
2006 ......................... 102,458 30,530 19,105 257
2007 ......................... 95,584 28,554 13,963 92
2008 ......................... 68,821 27,615 11,392 93
2009 ......................... 43,253 20,558 7,895 29
B. Refinance
2004 ......................... 79,838 6,922 6,507 57
2005 ......................... 73,520 7,727 6,331 26
2006 ......................... 64,969 11,750 6,240 68
2007 ......................... 59,591 16,174 6,332 74
2008 ......................... 44,342 21,926 6,817 177
2009 ......................... 36,765 21,765 5,922 59
C. Home improvement
2004 ......................... 17,119 128 1,269 5
2005 ......................... 20,239 219 1,372 3
2006 ......................... 20,886 490 1,425 2
2007 ......................... 19,428 889 1,494 2
2008 ......................... 12,621 681 1,324 36
2009 ......................... 9,710 439 1,110 1
1. See note to table 3.
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RHS). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are focused on
conventional loans, within the size limits set by the
Congress that meet the underwriting standards estab 
lished by these entities.
The HMDA data document the importance of the
secondary market for home loans. Overall, 82 percent
of thefirst lienhome purchaseandrefinanceloansfor
one  to four family properties originated in 2009 were
sold during the year (data not shown in tables).13 The
share of originations that are sold varies a bit from
year to year and by type and purpose of the loan
(table6,panelA).Forexample,about70percentof the
conventionalloansforthepurchaseof owner occupied
one  to four family dwellings that were originated in
2009 were sold that year. In contrast, about 92 percent
of the nonconventional loans used to purchase owner 
occupied homes were sold in 2009. The share of con 
ventionalloansmadetonon owneroccupantsthatare
sold is notably smaller than that for owner occupied
loans.
Application Disposition, Loan Pricing, and
Status under the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act
For purposes of analysis, loan applications and loans
reported under HMDA can be grouped in many ways.
Every loan application reported in 2009 can be orga 
nized into 25 distinct product categories characterized
bytypeof loanandproperty,purposeof theloan,and
lien and owner occupancy status (tables 7.A, 7.B, 8.A,
and 8.B). Each product category contains information
on the number of total and preapproval applications,
application denials, originated loans, loans with prices
above the reporting thresholds established by HMDA
reporting rules for identifying higher priced loans,
loans covered by the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), and the mean and
medianannualpercentagerate(APR)spreadsforloans
reported as higher priced. Table 7.A includes all appli 
cations filed prior to October 1, 2009; table 7.B in 
cludes applications filed over the remainder of the
year. This division corresponds to the change in price 
reporting rules noted earlier and discussed in more
detail in the later section “The 2009 HMDA Data on
certain types of agriculture related loans. (See a description of
Farmer Mac programs at www.farmermac.com/lenders/
fmacprograms/farmermacprograms.aspx.)
13. Loans that are sold in a different calendar year than the year
of origination are recorded in the HMDA data as being held in the
lender’s portfolio. In some cases, these loans are sold in subsequent
years, but those actions are not reported. Also, some loans recorded
assoldintheHMDAdataaresoldtoaffiliatedinstitutionsandthus
arenottruesecondary marketsales.In2009,6.5percentof theloans
recorded as sold in the HMDA data were sales to affiliates.
5. Home loans for one  to four family properties, by occupancy status of home, type of loan, and lien status, 2004–09
Number
Year




First lien Junior lien Unsecured First lien Junior lien Unsecured First lien Junior lien Unsecured First lien Junior lien Unsecured
A. Home purchase
2004...... 4,209,787 736,636 n.a. 573,606 1,235 n.a. 853,490 52,524 n.a. 2,703 7 n.a.
2005...... 4,520,378 1,221,999 n.a. 437,552 867 n.a. 1,049,555 149,954 n.a. 1,685 22 n.a.
2006...... 4,013,196 1,268,289 n.a. 416,143 601 n.a. 878,325 162,343 n.a. 1,407 18 n.a.
2007...... 3,031,606 551,343 n.a. 422,450 1,056 n.a. 605,714 50,202 n.a. 888 8 n.a.
2008...... 1,636,194 91,498 n.a. 971,528 1,077 n.a. 410,377 5,553 n.a. 3,461 4 n.a.
2009...... 1,128,950 42,083 n.a. 1,318,940 1,472 n.a. 287,760 2,036 n.a. 3,706 9 n.a.
B. Refinance
2004...... 6,185,418 464,170 n.a. 304,298 293 n.a. 608,956 12,711 n.a. 8,069 13 n.a.
2005...... 5,607,642 728,362 n.a. 158,198 276 n.a. 578,491 25,423 n.a. 3,236 21 n.a.
2006...... 4,347,348 1,035,602 n.a. 121,761 373 n.a. 546,430 38,712 n.a. 989 27 n.a.
2007...... 3,462,944 660,563 n.a. 196,544 353 n.a. 473,336 23,241 n.a. 879 15 n.a.
2008...... 2,374,781 219,012 n.a. 521,863 380 n.a. 328,844 9,070 n.a. 3,814 10 n.a.
2009...... 4,290,072 114,143 n.a. 998,089 496 n.a. 341,852 6,747 n.a. 7,460 16 n.a.
C. Home improvement
2004...... 357,618 395,582 151,292 2,697 2,243 617 40,028 8,153 8,160 30 54 10
2005...... 409,947 468,375 148,018 2,197 1,873 413 42,544 10,756 8,998 17 49 4
2006...... 360,321 553,152 154,257 3,957 1,735 423 43,913 13,739 8,190 18 20 6
2007...... 301,078 435,187 150,858 7,510 1,579 320 41,670 11,508 8,143 35 18 6
2008...... 179,506 181,402 155,704 10,477 1,610 260 26,482 5,473 7,215 135 13 10
2009...... 165,620 84,332 98,457 8,147 2,416 649 19,598 3,174 5,411 101 29 36
1. See note to table 3.
n.a. Not available.
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present the pricing information in one consolidated
table. Tables 8.A and 8.B provide information on pre 
approvals over the corresponding time periods.
Disposition of Applications
As noted, the 2009 HMDA data include information
on nearly 15 million loan applications, about 85 per 
cent of which were acted upon by the lender (data
derived from combining tables 7.A and 7.B). Patterns
of denial rates are largely consistent with what has
been observed in earlier years.14 Denial rates on appli 
cations for home purchase loans are notably lower
than those observed on applications for either refi 
nance or home improvement loans. Denial rates on
applications backed by manufactured housing are
much higher than those on applications backed by
14. The information provided in the tables is identical to that
provided in analyses of earlier years of HMDA data except for the
division of the data by the date of application. Comparisons of the
numbers in these two tables with those in the tables from earlier
years, including denial rates, can be made by consulting the follow 
ing articles: Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Brevoort,
Glenn B. Canner, and Christa N. Gibbs (2010), “The 2008 HMDA
Data: The Mortgage Market during a Turbulent Year,” Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 95, pp. A169–A211; Robert B. Avery, Ken 
neth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner (2008), “The 2007 HMDA
Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 94, pp. A107–A146; Robert B.
Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner (2007), “The
2006 HMDA Data,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 93, pp. A73–
A109; Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner
(2006), “Higher Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,”
Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 92, pp. A123–A166; and Robert B.
Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook (2005), “New Infor 
mation Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lend 
ing Enforcement,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 91, pp. 344–94.








Share sold MEMO: Share
sold to GSEs
2 Share sold MEMO: Share
sold to GSEs
2 Share sold MEMO: Share
sold to GSEs




2000 ........... 64.8 31.3 89.1 46.0 53.7 29.3 81.4 22.9
2001 ........... 66.8 34.6 86.1 46.2 57.9 34.0 92.2 23.0
2002 ........... 71.0 36.7 88.7 43.7 62.5 36.4 87.9 29.7
2003 ........... 72.3 33.1 91.2 40.7 63.1 31.8 80.8 21.6
2004 ........... 74.2 25.5 92.2 40.5 63.5 23.6 63.7 11.5
2005 ........... 75.9 18.7 89.9 32.6 69.7 18.0 49.7 16.3
2006 ........... 74.8 19.0 88.6 31.7 69.3 19.0 61.3 15.0
2007 ........... 70.1 29.1 87.6 32.5 61.4 26.9 74.9 27.6
2008 ........... 71.6 40.1 90.0 36.5 60.3 36.3 95.1 21.6
2009 ........... 70.4 39.7 91.7 34.5 57.4 34.1 88.7 35.6
B. Refinance
2000 ........... 47.4 18.0 84.5 50.0 47.3 21.7 86.3 42.8
2001 ........... 61.3 37.2 85.0 51.5 61.2 38.4 92.1 33.2
2002 ........... 66.8 40.4 85.7 45.0 65.9 43.2 81.3 45.4
2003 ........... 74.2 44.8 93.8 48.0 69.8 40.4 87.4 50.7
2004 ........... 69.0 27.6 93.2 44.2 62.2 22.6 88.0 35.9
2005 ........... 69.9 19.7 89.3 33.5 64.7 16.6 85.7 40.1
2006 ........... 65.7 15.2 86.8 31.8 64.9 15.7 79.0 29.6
2007 ........... 61.7 21.9 85.1 34.5 61.1 23.9 86.9 23.9
2008 ........... 65.3 38.0 88.8 35.4 56.8 33.0 95.7 20.4
2009 ........... 79.8 51.7 90.4 36.4 61.8 39.6 93.8 35.9
C. Home improvement
2000 ........... 6.3 1.1 15.6 4.7 4.4 .4 52.9 .5
2001 ........... 6.4 1.5 22.3 7.6 3.9 .8 73.7 1.1
2002 ........... 5.9 1.4 28.4 7.1 4.0 .9 55.3 3.6
2003 ........... 10.5 .8 43.8 6.7 6.5 .7 35.0 3.9
2004 ........... 23.6 6.0 48.7 23.5 23.1 7.5 20.2 7.4
2005 ........... 27.2 7.0 46.2 25.3 30.2 8.8 27.1 8.6
2006 ........... 22.0 5.3 60.4 31.8 29.4 8.9 29.5 15.9
2007 ........... 19.1 6.4 70.6 30.8 26.4 12.1 39.0 11.9
2008 ........... 14.7 8.7 80.0 49.2 20.0 14.5 74.7 6.3
2009 ........... 25.0 17.4 63.8 37.3 18.2 13.3 55.4 9.6
1. See note to table 3.
2. Loans sold to government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) include those with a purchaser type of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, or Farmer Mac.
A46 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010site built homes. For example, the denial rate for first 
lienconventionalhome purchaseloanapplicationsfor
owner occupied site built properties was 15.7 percent
in2009,comparedwithadenialrateof 59.0percentfor
first lien conventional home purchase loan applica 
tions for owner occupied manufactured homes (data
derived from tables 7.A and 7.B).
In addition to the application data provided under
HMDA, nearly 560,000 requests for preapproval were
reportedunderHMDAasactedonbythelender(data
derived from tables 8.A and 8.B). About one fourth of
these requests for preapproval were denied by the
lender. Not surprisingly, the number of requests for
preapproval is down substantially from the levels re 
corded at the height of the housing boom. In 2006,
covered institutions reported that they received nearly
1.2 million requests for preapproval upon which they
took action (data not shown in tables).
Loan Pricing
The collapse of the subprime and near prime credit
markets in 2007 resulted in a sharp curtailment of
lending at relatively high interest rates, a market out 
come reflected in the 2007 and 2008 HMDA data,
which show a marked decline in the number of loans
thatwereclassifiedforpurposesof reportingashigher
priced.Areviewof the2008HMDAdataalsorevealed
that a substantial fraction of loans extended in 2008
that were reported as higher priced were so classified
becauseof atypicalchangesintheinterestrateenviron 
ment rather than because the loans represented rela 
tively high credit risk.15
The 2009 HMDA data continue to show that the
level of higher priced lending is greatly diminished
from the levels reached in 2006. The data also show
that the incidence of higher priced lending across all
products in 2009 (about 5.5 percent; data derived from
tables 7.A and 7.B) is not only much lower than the
28.7percentratefoundin2006(2006datanotshownin
tables) but also about one half of the 11.6 percent rate
found in 2008 (2008 data not shown in tables). The
loan pricing information within the HMDA data is
explored more fully in the later section “The 2009
HMDA Data on Loan Pricing.”
HOEPA Loans
The HMDA data indicate which loans are covered by
the protections afforded by HOEPA. Under HOEPA,
certaintypesof mortgageloansthathaveinterestrates
or fees above specified levels require additional disclo 
sures to consumers and are subject to various restric 
tionsonloanterms.16For2009,1,153lendersreported
extending 6,500 loans covered by HOEPA (tables 7.A
and 7.B). In comparison, lenders reported on about
8,600 loans covered by HOEPA in 2008 (data regard 
ing lenders not shown in tables). In the aggregate,
HOEPA related lending made up less than 0.1 percent
of all the originations of home secured refinancing
loans and home improvement loans reported for 2009
(data derived from tables).17
THE 2009 HMDA DATA ON LOAN PRICING
As noted, the rules governing whether or not a loan is
classifiedashigherpricedunderHMDAwerechanged
in 2008, with implementation affecting loan classifica 
tionsforthe2009data.Thepurposeof therulechange
was to address concerns that had arisen about the
distortiveeffectsof changesintheinterestrateenviron 
ment on the reporting of higher priced lending under
the original methodology.18 Because of changes in
underlying market rates of interest, two loans of
equivalentcreditorprepaymentriskcouldbeclassified
differently at different points in time, an outcome that
was unintended.
The rules for reporting loan pricing information
under HMDA were originally adopted in 2002, cover 
ing lending beginning in 2004. Under these rules (the
“old rules”), lenders were required to compare the
APR on a loan to the yield on a Treasury security with
a comparable term to maturity to determine whether
the loan should be considered higher priced: If the
difference exceeded 3 percentage points for a first lien
loan or 5 percentage points for a junior lien loan, the
loanwasclassifiedashigherpricedandtheratespread
(the amount of the difference) was reported.
Analysis of the HMDA data revealed that the origi 
nal loan pricing classification methodology created
unintended distortions in reporting. Since most mort 
gages prepay well before the stated term of the loan,
lenders typically use relatively shorter term interest
rates when setting the price of mortgage loans. For
example, lenders often price 30 year fixed rate mort 
15. See Avery and others, “The 2008 HMDA Data: The Mort 
gage Market during a Turbulent Year,” in note 14.
16. The requirement to report HOEPA loans in the HMDA data
relates to whether the loan is subject to the original protections of
HOEPA, as determined by the coverage test in the Federal Reserve
Board’s Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226.32(a). The required report 
ing is not triggered by the more recently adopted protections for
“higher priced mortgage loans” under Regulation Z, notwithstand 
ingthatthoseprotectionswereadoptedunderauthoritygiventothe
Board by HOEPA. See 73 Fed. Reg. 44522 (July 30, 2008).
17. HOEPA does not apply to home purchase loans.
18. The potential for such distortions is discussed in prior re 
search; for example, see Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “Higher 
Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data,” in note 14.
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of fewer than 10 years, and they typically set interest
rates on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) based on
the yields on securities with much shorter terms. Thus,
a change in the relationship between shorter  and
longer term yields affected the reported incidence of
7. Disposition of applications for home loans, and origination and pricing of loans, by type of home and type of loan,
2009
A. Loans with application dates before October 1, 2009, threshold change




Acted upon by lender
Number




































First lien ............ 1,415,449 1,229,153 189,822 15.4 944,844 45,160 4.8 47.9 23.4 24.0 3.8 .9 4.4 4.1 . . .
Junior lien .......... 51,521 45,929 7,302 15.9 34,828 7,063 20.3 . . . . . . 91.8 7.1 1.2 5.9 5.7 . . .
Government backed
First lien ............ 1,588,919 1,403,515 208,478 14.9 1,125,063 56,504 5.0 88.5 7.6 3.7 .1 .1 3.5 3.3 . . .
Junior lien .......... 1,581 1,379 98 7.1 1,247 4 .3 . . . . . . 50.0 25.0 25.0 8.3 6.4 . . .
Refinance
Conventional
First lien ............ 6,218,103 5,309,600 1,144,080 21.5 3,806,948 120,408 3.2 48.9 21.3 20.0 9.0 .8 4.5 4.0 1,885
Junior lien .......... 166,847 148,366 44,552 30.0 95,851 20,522 21.4 . . . . . . 79.3 15.2 5.5 6.3 5.9 397
Government backed
First lien ............ 1,757,425 1,381,014 425,250 30.8 854,630 61,060 7.1 92.6 5.5 1.8 .1 .0 3.4 3.2 284
Junior lien .......... 813 607 149 24.5 420 7 1.7 . . . . . . 71.4 28.6 .0 6.1 5.4 . . .
Home improvement
Conventional
First lien ............ 267,265 227,387 70,564 31.0 142,781 28,122 19.7 37.0 25.2 24.3 11.7 1.9 4.9 4.5 840
Junior lien .......... 164,257 140,543 62,187 44.2 71,000 12,010 16.9 . . . . . . 73.6 17.8 8.5 6.6 6.0 465
Government backed
First lien ............ 16,073 12,716 4,817 37.9 6,868 818 11.9 70.4 10.4 14.2 5.0 .0 4.0 3.4 5




backed)........... 181,904 177,263 78,924 44.5 77,557 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manufactured
Conventional, first lien
Home purchase........ 166,420 159,732 92,937 58.2 37,065 28,261 76.2 15.6 18.3 34.2 17.7 14.2 6.4 5.9 . . .
Refinance ............. 70,219 60,693 23,879 39.3 31,150 15,956 51.2 17.0 17.7 36.2 24.0 5.1 6.0 5.8 1,298




Home purchase........ 338,882 297,621 53,181 17.9 221,421 19,405 8.8 56.5 21.7 16.2 3.9 1.6 4.3 3.8 . . .
Refinance ............. 504,929 426,480 123,753 29.0 275,839 14,449 5.2 49.1 21.6 22.7 5.2 1.4 4.5 4.0 105




Home purchase........ 30,659 29,666 1,095 3.7 27,915 1,152 4.1 30.1 31.7 31.6 4.7 1.9 4.9 4.6 . . .
Refinance ............. 31,974 30,888 1,828 5.9 28,455 1,064 3.7 32.0 30.6 33.0 4.0 .6 4.8 4.6 6




Home purchase........ 7,161 6,504 956 14.7 5,229 215 4.1 47.0 31.6 18.1 2.3 .9 4.3 4.1 . . .
Refinance ............. 12,067 11,118 1,886 17.0 8,704 449 5.2 48.3 29.8 19.2 2.5 .2 4.3 4.0 . . .
Other.................... 4,085 3,683 573 15.6 2,994 114 3.8 43.0 23.7 29.8 3.5 .0 4.4 4.0 1
Total...................... 13,197,399 11,278,580 2,599,512 23.0 7,898,335 449,006 5.7 51.2 15.5 23.3 7.7 2.3 4.6 3.9 5,810
1.Annualpercentagerate(APR)spreadisthedifferencebetweentheAPRontheloanandtheyieldonacomparable maturityTreasurysecurity.Thethreshold
for first lien loans is a spread of 3 percentage points; for junior lien loans, it is a spread of 5 percentage points.
2. Loans covered by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), which does not apply to home purchase loans.
3. Business related applications and loans are those for which the lender reported that the race, ethnicity, and sex of the applicant or co applicant are “not
applicable”; all other applications and loans are nonbusiness related.
4. Includes applications and loans for which occupancy status was missing.
5. Includes business related and nonbusiness related applications and loans for owner occupied and non owner occupied properties.
... Not applicable.
A48 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010higher priced lending. For example, when short term
interest rates fell relative to long term rates, the num 
ber and proportion of loans reported as higher priced
fell even when other factors, such as lenders’ under 
writing practices or borrowers’ credit risk or prepay 
ment characteristics, remained unchanged.
For ARMs, this effect was further exacerbated by
themannerinwhichAPRsarecalculated.Theinterest
rates on most ARM loans, after the initial interest rate
resetdate,aresetbasedontheinterestrateforone year
securities.Asaresult,theAPRsforARMs,whichtake
into account the expected interest rates on a loan
7. Disposition of applications for home loans, and origination and pricing of loans, by type of home and type of loan,
2009
B. Loans with application dates on or after October 1, 2009, threshold change













































First lien ............ 202,357 178,384 31,573 17.7 139,640 4,867 3.5 37.9 22.6 16.5 14.1 4.7 4.2 2.6 2.2 . . .
Junior lien .......... 9,810 8,879 1,575 17.7 6,887 1,058 15.4 . . . . . . . . . 33.7 53.6 12.7 4.8 4.2 . . .
Government backed
First lien ............ 239,838 214,617 37,866 17.6 170,716 2,447 1.4 78.6 11.4 4.3 .8 .3 4.7 2.0 1.7 . . .
Junior lien .......... 266 226 26 11.5 194 5 2.6 . . . . . . . . . 40.0 60.0 .0 4.2 4.3 . . .
Refinance
Conventional
First lien ............ 747,592 630,921 158,935 25.2 442,401 9,982 2.3 32.7 19.6 13.6 15.3 6.7 12.1 3.0 2.4 188
Junior lien .......... 27,587 25,102 8,773 34.9 15,242 1,589 10.4 . . . . . . . . . 30.7 37.3 32.1 4.9 4.4 63
Government backed
First lien ............ 244,580 192,941 62,850 32.6 120,499 3,938 3.3 38.3 39.5 14.1 5.6 1.2 1.3 2.2 2.1 26
Junior lien .......... 110 87 21 24.1 64 4 6.3 . . . . . . . . . 100.0 .0 .0 3.6 3.6 4
Home improvement
Conventional
First lien ............ 37,213 32,246 12,870 39.9 17,868 3,026 16.9 24.3 19.6 15.9 16.5 7.6 16.1 3.3 2.7 111
Junior lien .......... 31,575 28,179 14,818 52.6 12,283 1,052 8.6 . . . . . . . . . 30.4 29.3 40.3 5.4 4.6 48
Government backed
First lien ............ 2,120 1,507 558 37.0 868 149 17.2 20.1 36.2 14.1 5.4 16.1 8.1 2.9 2.4 1




backed)........... 35,729 34,787 16,783 48.2 17,100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manufactured
Conventional, first lien
Home purchase........ 34,721 33,794 21,150 62.6 5,856 4,358 74.4 5.8 5.8 8.4 21.5 19.0 39.6 4.9 4.4 . . .
Refinance ............. 9,928 8,994 4,100 45.6 4,367 2,023 46.3 12.5 11.1 15.0 24.2 15.8 21.5 3.9 3.5 180




Home purchase........ 51,440 45,689 8,571 18.8 35,126 1,928 5.5 37.6 19.4 14.3 16.1 6.5 6.2 2.7 2.3 . . .
Refinance ............. 71,950 59,462 19,284 32.4 37,897 1,584 4.2 36.1 21.3 15.7 14.5 6.1 6.3 2.7 2.3 11




Home purchase........ 5,251 5,120 217 4.2 4,843 188 3.9 19.7 30.3 21.8 20.7 3.2 4.3 2.7 2.5 . . .
Refinance ............. 5,328 5,195 291 5.6 4,867 216 4.4 25.9 27.3 21.3 16.7 6.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 0




Home purchase........ 985 910 151 16.6 733 57 7.8 49.1 22.8 12.3 12.3 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.0 . . .
Refinance ............. 1,425 1,336 228 17.1 1,073 64 6.0 23.4 40.6 15.6 10.9 1.6 7.8 2.6 2.2 0
Other.................... 534 515 105 20.4 402 5 1.2 40.0 20.0 .0 40.0 .0 .0 2.4 2.1 0
Total...................... 1,792,509 1,537,092 413,455 26.9 1,052,601 40,187 3.8 28.7 17.7 11.9 16.2 10.6 14.9 3.3 2.6 692
NOTE: See notes to table 7.A.
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indexratesusedtoestablishinterestratesafterthereset
do not change, will be particularly sensitive to changes
in one year interest rates. Consequently, the share of
ARMs reported as higher priced fell when one year
ratesdeclinedrelativetootherratesevenif therelation 
ship between long  and intermediate term rates re 
mained constant.
Toaddressthesedistortions,theprice reportingrules
under HMDA were modified (the “new rules”). For
applications taken beginning October 1, 2009 (and for
allloansthatcloseonorafterJanuary1,2010),lenders
comparetheAPRontheloanwiththeestimatedAPR
(termed the “average prime offer rate” (APOR)) that a
high quality prime borrower would receive on a loan
of a similar type (for example, a 30 year fixed rate
mortgage). The APOR is estimated using the interest
rates and points (and margin for ARMs) reported by
Freddie Mac in its Primary Mortgage Market Survey
(PMMS).19 If the difference is more than 1.5 percent 
agepointsforafirst lienloanormorethan3.5percent 
age points for a junior lien loan, then the loan is
classified as higher priced and the rate spread is re 
ported.20 Since APORs move with changes in market
rates and are product specific, it is anticipated that the
distortions that existed under the old rules will be
greatly reduced.
19. The weekly Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey
reports the average contract rates and points for all loans and the
margin for adjustable rate loans for loans offered to prime borrow 
ers (those that pose the lowest credit risk). The survey currently
reports information for two fixed rate mortgage products (30 year
and 15 year terms) and two ARM products (1 year adjustable rate
and 5 year adjustable rate). See Freddie Mac, “Weekly Primary
Mortgage Market Survey,” webpage, www.freddiemac.com/dlink/
html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp.
20. Formoredetails,seeFederalFinancialInstitutionsExamina 
tion Council, “FFIEC Rate Spread Calculator,” webpage,
www.ffiec.gov/ratespread/default.aspx.
8. Home purchase lending that began with a request for preapproval: Disposition and pricing, by type of home, 2009
A. Loans with application dates before October 1, 2009, threshold change
Type of home
Requests for preapproval Applications preceded
by requests for preapproval
1
Loan originations whose applications were preceded













































First lien ............ 264,145 70,550 26.7 154,432 23,986 17,069 104,841 2,303 2.2 66.4 19.8 11.5 2.0 .4 3.9 3.5
Junior lien........... 5,928 1,075 18.1 4,134 309 127 3,486 922 26.4 . . . . . . 93.8 5.5 .7 5.9 5.8
Government backed
First lien ............ 184,995 47,817 25.8 124,553 12,744 10,544 96,314 4,789 5.0 85.6 10.5 3.6 .2 .1 3.6 3.3
Junior lien........... 114 12 10.5 96 14 15 65 1 1.5 . . . . . . 100.0 .0 .0 5.0 5.0
Manufactured
Conventional, first lien . 5,618 1,400 24.9 3,829 361 918 2,117 1,340 63.3 14.4 19.9 24.8 14.9 26.1 7.5 6.2
Other.................. 2,733 709 25.9 1,969 606 266 1,006 93 9.2 85.0 12.9 2.0 .0 .0 3.5 3.4
Non-owner occupied
4
Conventional, first lien . 33,198 8,109 24.4 21,047 3,020 2,057 14,767 800 5.4 62.3 21.6 12.6 2.3 1.3 4.1 3.7
Other.................. 1,646 216 13.1 1,393 179 136 1,064 14 1.3 14.3 .0 95.7 .0 .0 5.4 5.5
BUSINESS RELATED
3
Conventional, first lien .. 573 13 2.3 550 59 85 385 36 9.4 33.3 30.6 33.3 2.8 .0 4.8 4.5
Other ................... 123 8 6.5 114 14 21 74 2 2.7 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 3.3 3.3
MULTIFAMILY
5
Conventional, first lien .. 98 6 6.1 85 15 4 63 6 9.5 50.0 33.3 16.7 .0 .0 4.1 4.1
Other ................... 35 0 .0 33 13 4 16 2 12.5 50.0 50.0 .0 .0 .0 4.0 4.0
Total.................... 499,206 129,915 26.0 312,235 41,320 31,246 224,198 10,308 4.6 62.3 13.8 17.1 3.1 3.7 4.4 3.6
1. These applications are included in the total reported in table 7.A.
2. See table 7.A, note 1.
3. See table 7.A, note 3.
4. See table 7.A, note 4.
5. See table 7.A, note 5.
... Not applicable.
A50 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010Since the new reporting rules applied only to loans
with application dates on or after October 1, both
reporting rules were in effect during the fourth quarter
of 2009.Forloansthatoriginatedinthefourthquarter,
theoldthresholdwasusedif theirapplicationdatewas
before October 1, and the new threshold was used
otherwise. Since the reported spreads for the old and
new rules are relative to different reporting thresholds,
the data are not directly comparable.21 Therefore, we
conductouranalysisof thepricingdataforeachreport 
ing regime separately.
The Old Price Reporting Rules
As mentioned, under the rules that governed HMDA
at the beginning of 2009, a change in the relationship
between shorter  and longer term yields could affect
the reported incidence of higher priced lending. The
relationship between shorter  and longer term interest
rates can be seen in the yield curve for Treasury securi 
ties, which displays how the yields on these securities
vary with the term to maturity. The slope of the yield
curve,whichwasalreadysteepatthebeginningof 2009
relative to patterns observed in previous years, contin 
ued to steepen. The difference between the yield on a
30 year Treasury security and that on a 1 year Trea 
sury security increased sharply in the early portion of
the year and remained well above the levels observed
from2006through2008(figure2).Whilethedifference
between the yields on the 30 year and 5 year Treasury
securitiesdidnotincreaseassharply,in2009thisdiffer 
ence remained consistently above the levels generally
observed in the previous three years. As discussed
above, this change would be expected to decrease the
incidence of reported higher priced lending, particu 
larly for ARMs, even in the absence of any changes in
high risk lending activity.
21. The 2009 public HMDA data release contains a variable
indicating whether the loan or application was subject to the old or
new pricing rules.
8. Home purchase lending that began with a request for preapproval: Disposition and pricing, by type of home, 2009
B. Loans with application dates on or after October 1, 2009, threshold change
Type of home
Requests for preapproval Applications preceded
by requests for preapproval
1
Loan originations whose applications were preceded















































First lien ............ 27,846 9,514 34.2 16,333 2,102 2,950 10,808 50 .5 .0 .0 .0 58.0 18.0 24.0 4.3 3.6
Junior lien........... 1,072 243 22.7 751 53 20 650 219 33.7 . . . . . . . . . 32.4 63.5 4.1 4.3 4.2
Government backed
First lien ............ 22,587 7,905 35.0 13,922 1,023 1,652 10,968 4 .0 .0 .0 .0 50.0 .0 50.0 5.9 4.2
Junior lien........... 19 2 10.5 17 2 4 11 1 9.1 . . . . . . . . . .0 100.0 .0 4.9 4.9
Manufactured
Conventional, first lien . 2,310 289 12.5 2,011 160 820 736 326 44.3 .0 .0 .0 20.6 20.3 59.2 6.8 5.8
Other.................. 264 101 38.3 162 24 24 110 0 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-owner occupied
4
Conventional, first lien . 3,651 948 26.0 2,524 287 334 1,829 22 1.2 .0 .0 .0 59.1 22.7 18.2 4.6 3.7
Other.................. 187 44 23.5 140 19 23 96 0 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BUSINESS RELATED
3
Conventional, first lien .. 79 4 5.1 74 3 10 61 3 4.9 .0 .0 .0 66.7 33.3 .0 3.6 3.1
Other ................... 13 1 7.7 12 2 4 6 0 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MULTIFAMILY
5
Conventional, first lien .. 15 0 .0 13 2 3 6 0 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Other ................... 3 0 .0 3 0 1 1 0 .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total.................... 58,046 19,051 32.8 35,962 3,677 5,845 25,282 625 2.5 .0 .0 .0 29.4 35.4 35.2 5.7 4.6
1. These applications are included in the total reported in table 7.B.
2. See table 7.A, note 1.
3. See table 7.A, note 3.
4. See table 7.A, note 4.
5. See table 7.A, note 5.
... Not applicable.
The 2009 HMDA Data: The Mortgage Market in a Time of Low Interest Rates and Economic Distress A51In 2008, the decrease in the incidence of higher 
pricedlendingthatwouldbeexpectedtofollowasteep 
eningyieldcurvewasmitigatedbythe“flighttoquality”
and liquidity concerns that were caused by the finan 
cialcrisisinlate2008.Thisdevelopmentresultedinthe
yields on Treasury securities falling relative to rates on
other securities, including mortgage loans. As a result,
the spread between the HMDA reporting threshold
andtheAPRona30 yearfixed rateprimeloan,based
on the rates reported by Freddie Mac’s PMMS, fell
during most of 2008 (figure 3). This pattern carried
into 2009 but began to reverse itself early in the year,
andbymidyearthespreadsbetweentheHMDAreport 
ing threshold and the APRs on the 30 year fixed rate
and 5 year ARM from the PMMS had increased to
levels well above those observed in the previous three
years.
Thehistoricallyhighspreadsbetweenmortgagerates
for prime quality borrowers (reflected by the APRs
calculatedfromthePMMS)andtheHMDAreporting
threshold imply that the incidence of higher priced
lending in 2009 would be below the levels for earlier
years, even if high risk lending activity had remained
the same. Furthermore, the increasing spreads over
2009 suggest that loans of a given credit risk that may
have been reported as higher priced earlier in the year
may not have been so reported later in the year. This
possibility makes drawing inferences about changes in
high credit risk lending based upon changes in the
incidenceof reportedhigher pricedlendingmuchmore
complicated.
In analyzing HMDA data from previous years in
which the yield curve changed substantially, we relied
on a methodology that used a different definition of a
“higher pricedloan”thatislesssensitivetoyieldcurve
changes and, therefore, more fully reflective of high 
risk lending activity. This methodology defines the
credit risk component of a loan as the difference be 
tween the APR on that loan and the APR available to
the lowest risk prime borrowers at that time. This
credit risk component is assumed to be constant over
time. In other words, we assume that a nonprime bor 
rower who received a loan with an APR that was
1.25 percentage points above the APR available to
prime borrowers at that time would receive, if the
nonprime borrower’s characteristics remained con 
stant, a loan that was 1.25 percentage points above the
available rate for prime borrowers at all other times,
regardless of any changes in the interest rate environ 
ment. We then examine the share of loans with credit
risk components that are above specific thresholds.
Theapproachof creatingathresholdthatissetrelative
to the mortgage rates that are available to prime 
quality borrowers is similar to the new HMDA report 
ingrulesandshouldprovideamoreaccuratedepiction
of the extent to which high risk lending has changed;
for instance, the lending data under the new rules are
relatively free of the distortions introduced in the inci 
dence of reported higher priced lending by changes in
the interest rate environment.
In estimating the credit risk component of loans in
the HMDA data, we use, as the measure of the rate
available to prime borrowers, the APR derived from
the information reported in the Freddie Mac PMMS








2009 2008 2007 2006
1-year
5-year
NOTE: The data are weekly, and the spreads are over 30-year Treasury
bonds. Prior to mid-February 2006, the 30-year Treasury bond was not
available, and the data are missing. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board, Statistical Release H.15,
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current/h15.htm. 
3.   HMDA price-reporting threshold, interest rates for fixed-  
      and adjustable-rate loans, and spreads between the  


















NOTE: For explanation of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)
price-reporting threshold, see text. The threshold and annual percentage rates
(APRs) are for conventional first-lien 30-year prime loans. 
SOURCE: APRs from the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey;
see note to figure 1. 
A52 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010fora30 yearfixed rateloan.22Asanapproximationof
the APR on loans in the HMDA data, we add the
reportedspread(forhigher pricedloans)totheappro 
priate HMDA reporting threshold for a 30 year loan.
We refer to the resulting estimate of the credit risk
component as the “PMMS spread.” Because of the
large spreads in 2009 between the HMDA reporting
threshold and the APRs on prime quality 30 year
fixed rateloans,onlythoseloanswithaPMMSspread
in excess of 2.59 percentage points would have been
reported as higher priced under HMDA at all points
during 2009. Therefore, this spread is the minimum
PMMSspreadthatcanbeusedasathreshold.Werefer
to loans with a PMMS spread of 2.59 percentage
points or higher as “adjusted higher priced” loans.
The share of loans reported as higher priced under




of 27.2 percent in 2006 and from 10.7 percent in 2008.
The decline in the incidence of higher priced lending
was observed for all types of lenders.
Lookingexclusivelyatchangesintheannualratesof
higher priced lending can obscure the information
about how the mortgage market is developing over
time. To better illustrate how changes in higher priced
lending have played out in recent years, we examined
monthlypatternsinhigher pricedlendingactivity.The
monthly data show that the incidence of reported
higher priced home purchase lending fell over the
course of 2009 (figure 4, top panel; see line labeled
“HMDA(oldrules)”).Asimilardeclineisobservedfor
refinance loans, though the incidence of reported
higher priced refinance lending ticked up slightly in
the latter portion of the year (figure 4, bottom panel).
As discussed, this decline in reported higher priced
lendingisexpectedgiventheincreasingspreadbetween
mortgage rates and the HMDA reporting threshold.
Using our methodology to correct for distortions
caused by changes in the interest rate environment, we
find that the share of adjusted higher priced loans
(shown in figure 4) was relatively flat for home 
purchaselendingin2009,suggestingthatthedeclinein
the incidence of reported higher priced lending in the
HMDA data for that period largely reflected changes
intheinterestrateenvironment.Theshareof refinance
loans that were considered adjusted higher priced in
2009 also remained at historically low levels. The small
increase observed in the incidence of higher priced
lending in 2009 appears to reflect an actual increase in
high risk lending, though the increase was small and
shortlived.Thesefiguressuggestthatlendingtohigher 
risk borrowers, which declined sharply beginning in
2007, remained at low levels during the year, with little
indicationthatlendingtosuchborrowershasbegunto
rebound. However, it is important to note that the
PMMS spread that we use in this analysis is signifi 
cantly higher than the PMMS spreads we have em 
ployed in previous years, and this threshold may not
capture a considerable share of lending to high risk
borrowers.
The New Price Reporting Rules
The new price reporting rules, which apply to loans
originated during 2009 with application dates from
October to December, use reporting thresholds that
22. By using the APR for the 30 year fixed rate mortgage, we are
implicitly treating all loans in the HMDA data as though they were
30 year fixed rate loans. Data from large mortgage servicers pro 
vided by Lender Processing Services, Inc., show that less than 1 per 
cent of first lien mortgages in 2009 were ARMs. Because of the
rarity of ARMs and the prevalence of 30 year loans, we do not
expect our assumption to substantially distort the analysis.
4.   Higher-priced share of lending, by annual percentage   
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(new rules)
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NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first-lien mortgages for site-built
properties and exclude business loans. Annual percentage rates are for
conventional 30-year fixed-rate prime mortgages. For explanations of old and
new pricing rules, see text. 
PMMS Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey.  
HMDA Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.  
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thetimealoan’sinterestrateislocked.Thethresholdis
similar to the one used earlier to adjust for changes in
the interest rate environment, though it has two major
advantages over our measure. First, the new rule
threshold varies with the initial period over which a
loan’s interest rate does not change, which means that
the reporting threshold for ARMs can be set lower (or
higher) than the threshold for 30 year fixed rate loans.
In the preceding analysis, because we could not distin 
guish fixed rate from ARM loans (or between types of
ARMs), we had to assume that all loans originated
during 2009 were fixed rate. Analyses of the data re 
ported using the new rules do not need to rely on such
an assumption. The second advantage is that because
lenders know the APR on the loan when comparing it
with the threshold, whereas we could only approxi 
mate a loan’s APR when it was reported as higher
priced under the old rules, the reporting threshold is
not constrained by the maximum PMMS spread that
was in effect over the period being examined. Conse 
quently,thespreadthatgovernsreportingislowerthan
wecoulduseinourattempttocorrecttheoldreporting
rules for changes in the interest rate environment. The
resultshouldbeamoreaccuratedepictionof subprime
lending activity that is less sensitive to changes in the
interest rate environment.
Asdiscussed,thenewrulesappliedonlytoafraction
of originated loans reported during the year. The new
rulesappliedtolessthan15percentof loansoriginated
in October, 62 percent of those originated in Novem 
ber, and 85 percent of those originated in December
(data not shown in tables). The shares of these loans
that were reported as higher priced during this period
are shown in the two panels of figure 4. The higher
incidences observed under the new reporting rules pri 
marily appear to reflect the large spreads in effect dur 
ing 2009 between mortgage rates for prime borrowers
and the old HMDA reporting threshold that reduced
reportingundertheoldrules.Beyondthat,itisdifficult
to compare the two numbers, as they are spreads rela 
tive to two different thresholds. Since we observe the
incidences for such a short period, we are unable to
make any inferences about the volume of subprime
lending activity other than that it seems to have been
relatively stable over this three month period. How 
ever, beginning with the 2010 HMDA data, when the
new reporting rules will apply to all originated loans,
we expect these rules to provide a more accurate and
consistent depiction of lending activity to high risk
borrowers.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN THE MORTGAGE MARKET
The share of new mortgage loans either explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the federal government has
risen dramatically since 2006. We estimate that by the
end of 2009, almost 6 out of 10 new owner occupied
home purchase loans were originated through the
FHA, VA, and, to a much lesser extent, the FSA or




To facilitate our analysis, we employ a revised data set
designed to correct for one of the limitations in the
HMDA reporting system.
Under HMDA reporting rules, all loans originated
under the FHA, VA, FSA, or RHS programs must be
identified as such.23 However, loans placed in pools
that are guaranteed by or sold to the housing related
government sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, are identified only if they are sold di 
rectly to the GSEs or directly placed in a pool during
the same year of the loan origination. The HMDA
data therefore tend to undercount loans sold to the
GSEs for two reasons. First, sales can take place in a
yearsubsequenttoorigination,especiallyamongloans
originated during the fourth quarter. Second, lenders
maynotsellloansdirectlytotheGSEsbutinsteadmay
sellthemtootherfinancialinstitutionsthatformmort 
gage pools for which investors subsequently obtain
GSE credit guarantees.
Fortheanalysisinthissection,weadjusttheHMDA
data to attempt to correct for the undercount of GSE
loans.First,financialinstitutionsarerequiredtoreport
under HMDA their loan purchases as well as their
originations. Using information on loan size, location,
dateof origination,anddateof purchase,wewereable
to match more than 50 percent of the loans that were
originated from 2006 to 2009 and then sold to another
financial institution to the record for the same loan in
the loan purchase file. From those matched, we are
then able to obtain the ultimate loan disposition from
the filing of loan purchases. Of the portion we were
unabletomatch,mostwereoriginated(andpurchased)
by one large organization, which supplied us with the
aggregatedispositionof thepurchasedloans.Forthose
sold loans that we were still unable to match, we as 
23. For the 2009 reporting year, 77.3 percent of the nonconven 
tional home purchase loans were FHA loans, 13.9 percent were VA
guaranteed, and 8.8 percent were covered under the FSA or RHS
programs. For nonconventional refinance loans, 83.7 percent were
FHA, 15.9 percent VA, and 0.4 percent FSA or RHS.
A54 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010sumed that the distribution of the ultimate disposition
matchedthedistributionof loansthatwecouldmatch.




following January to assign the ultimate disposition of
conventional loans.24 The imputation was conducted
separately for the 14 largest mortgage originators and
tookaccountof thecharacteristicsof theloan,includ 
ing size and location.
The changing structure of the mortgage market
between 2006 and 2009 may be illustrated using our
adjusted data for the four major loan types reported
under HMDA (figure 5). The figure groups first lien
site built mortgages into four distinct categories:
(1) loans insured by the FHA, backed by the VA, or
issued or guaranteed by the FSA or RHS (“noncon 
ventional”);(2)conventionalloanssoldtoFannieMae
orFreddieMacorplacedinpoolsguaranteedbythem
(“GSE”); (3) conventional loans sold to an affiliate or
heldintheportfolioof theoriginatinglender(“portfo 
lio”); and (4) all other conventional loans, including
those sold into the private securitization market or to
unaffiliatedinstitutions(“other”).Panels5.A,5.B,and
5.Cshowpatternsforowner occupiedhome purchase,
refinance, and home improvement loans; panel 5.D
shows patterns for all non owner occupied loans re 
gardless of purpose.25
Our adjusted data show a greater role for the GSEs
than that implied by the raw HMDA data. The raw
datareportedintable6showthat41percentof owner 
occupied refinance loans originated in 2009 were re 
ported as sold directly to the GSEs; our revised data
imply that ultimately over 57 percent of such loans
were either purchased by the GSEs or placed in a
mortgagepoolguaranteedbythem.Thedatainfigure5
also show that the subprime based private securitiza 
tion market declined at the end of 2006 and through 
out2007,whiletheGSEsgainedmarketshare.Portfolio
and nonconventional market shares remained rela 
tively constant until the end of 2007. The years 2008
24. For 2009, only the September data were used.
25. The home improvement and non owner occupied loan cat 
egories are more heterogeneous than the other two. The home 
improvementcategorymayincludesome“cash out”refinanceloans,
whichwouldbetreatedasrefinancingsexceptthatsomeof thefunds
are used for home improvements, as well as smaller new loans on
homes that previously had no mortgage. The non owner occupied
category presented here is heterogeneous by construction since it
includes all types of loans. As a consequence of this heterogeneity,
thedispositionof liensinthesetwocategoriesislikelymoresensitive
tomarketchangesthantherefinanceandhome purchasecategories.
The huge jump in GSE share for home improvement and non 
owner occupied property loans at the end of 2009, for example, is
probably occurring because the refinance component of each group
rose as part of the late 2009 refinance boom.
5.   Share of lending, by purpose of loan and occupancy status   















A. Home purchase, owner occupied









B. Refinance, owner occupied










C. Home improvement, owner occupied










D. All loans, non-owner occupied
NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on one- to four-family,
site-built properties and exclude business loans. For definitions of loan types,
see text. 
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tional home purchase market share rising dramati 
cally. The GSEs play a much more prominent role in
the refinance market, with their share rising dramati 
cally at the beginning of 2008, falling through August,
and then rising again into 2009.
These patterns reflect the actions of a number of
players. Nonconventional lending has traditionally fo 
cusedonthehigh LTVmarket,offeringinvestorsmort 
gage insurance protection against borrower default.
Private mortgage insurance companies also offer simi 
lar insurance for high LTV conventional loans, with
PMI (or some other credit enhancement) required by
statute for loans with LTVs above 80 percent that are
sold to the GSEs. Lenders can also choose to forgo
PMIand(1)holdtheloandirectlyor(2)issueasecond
lien for the portion of the loan above 80 percent (a
piggyback loan) and still sell the 80 percent loan to the
GSEs.ThechoiceamongPMI,publicmortgageinsur 
ance, or a piggyback loan is likely to be made by
borrowers (and lenders) based on the relative pricing
and underwriting standards of the PMI and the non 
conventional loan products. Prices and underwriting
establishedbypurchasersinthesecondarymarketalso
matter. Both GSEs charge fees for loans they purchase
or guarantee, with the fees varying by LTV and credit
quality. The GSE, FHA, and VA programs are also
subject to statutory limits on loan size, which can and
havebeenchanged.Finally,thewillingnessof financial
institutions to hold mortgages in portfolio is likely to
be sensitive to their costs of funds, their capital posi 
tion, and other factors.
Manyof theseitemshavechangedoverthepastfour
yearsandlikelyinfluencedthemarketoutcomes.First,
the Congress authorized an increase in the loan size
limits applicable for the FHA and VA programs and
GSE purchases as part of the Economic Stimulus Act,
passed in February 2008; it did so again as part of the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), en 
acted in July 2008; and it did so once more as part of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA), passed in February 2009.26
HERA also provided tax assistance (in effect, an
interest free loan) to first time homebuyers meeting
certainincomeconditionsof upto$7,500beginningin
April 2008. ARRA updated this program, providing a
tax credit of up to $8,000 for first time homebuyers
purchasing a home between January 1, 2009, and No 
vember 30, 2009. Finally, the Worker, Homeowner 
ship,andBusinessAssistanceActof 2009extendedthe
first timehomebuyertaxcreditprogramthroughApril
2010 and allowed certain long term homeowners pur 
chasing new homes to claim a tax credit of up to
$6,500. By primarily targeting first time homebuyers,
theseprogramslikelystimulateddemandforhigh LTV
home purchase mortgages. Moreover, an FHA loan
may have had particular appeal for such borrowers
because the FHA allowed borrowers to use the tax
credit in advance as part of their down payment.
Second, with losses mounting in 2007 and 2008,
PMI companies tightened underwriting and raised
prices starting in the spring of 2008. These changes
likely reduced the ability of the GSEs to purchase
higher LTV loans (loans with LTVs above 80 percent)
because of the requirement that such loans carry PMI
inordertobeeligibleforGSEpurchase.TheGSEsalso
altered their own underwriting and fee schedule in
March 2008 and again in June. In particular, the GSEs
stopped buying loans with LTVs in excess of 95 per 
cent and increased prices for other high LTV loans.27
The increased GSE pricing for high LTV loans was
slightly modified in March 2009 but remained in place
through the end of 2009. In contrast, the pricing of
FHA and VA loans has been little changed from 2006,
with a slight increase in pricing in September 2008.28
26. New standards released on March 6, 2008, raised the GSE
and FHA loan size limits to $729,750 in certain areas designated by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development as “high
cost.” FHA loan limits were also raised above their 2007 levels to
new amounts in many other areas. Prior to these changes, the GSEs
couldnotpurchasesingle familyhomeloansabove$417,000inmost
states, while the FHA could not insure single family home loans
above $271,050 in most areas of the country. (The GSE loan limits
were higher in Alaska and Hawaii; the maximum loan size for the
FHA program was as low as $200,160 in some low cost areas.) VA
loansdonothaveasizelimit,buttheydohaveaguaranteelimitthat
istiedtoGSEloanlimits.FSAloansarealsosubjecttodifferent,and
generally higher, limits. Only lower  or moderate income borrowers
inruralareasareeligibleforRHSloans,buttheloansdonothavean
explicit maximum size limit. The increased limits were allowed to
remain in place through the end of 2009. Analysis in a previous
article concluded that the increase in limits accounted for less than
10percentof thegrowthof nonconventionallendingin2008;never 
theless, the limit increase likely changed the mix of borrowers using
theseprograms.SeeAveryandothers,“The2008HMDAData:The
Mortgage Market during a Turbulent Year,” in note 14.
27. PMI annual premiums for loans with LTVs above 80 percent
generally range from 0.30 percentage points to 1.20 percentage
points, depending on LTV, credit score, and other factors (see, for
example,thewebsiteof theMortgageGuarantyInsuranceCorpora 
tionatwww.mgic.com).OnMarch1,2008,FannieMaeandFreddie
Mac raised their one time delivery fees for 30 year loans with LTVs
above 70 percent to a range of 0.75 to 2.00 percentage points,
depending on the borrower’s credit score. On March 9, 2008, both
GSEs added an additional fee of 0.25 percentage point for “market
conditions.” In June 2008, the GSEs raised their fees again, by an
average of 0.50 percentage point. These fees have remained more or
less unchanged since then. In the summer of 2008, many PMI
companiesannouncedfurtherincreasesintheirrates,particularlyin
markets they defined as “distressed.” In some areas, it became
almostimpossibletoobtainPMIforloanswithLTVsof greaterthan
90 percent. Most of these restrictions remained in place for 2009.
28. For the first half of 2008, the FHA charged a flat delivery fee
of 1.50percentagepointsandanannualpremiumof 0.50percentage
point to insure 30 year mortgages. On July 14, 2008, the FHA
A56 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010Bothprogramshavelimitedabilitytopriceonthebasis
of risk; program volumes are determined more by the
actions of other market participants than by proactive
decisionmakingontheprograms’part.Towardtheend
of 2009, the FHA decided to stop making loans to
borrowers with FICO scores below 580.29 Otherwise,
other than an expansion of the FHA’s streamlined
refinancing programs, FHA underwriting did not
change substantially over this period.30
Other developments likely also affected market
sharesoverthe2006–09period.Themarketforprivate 
label mortgage backed securities essentially disap 
pearedbythebeginningof 2007,takingwithitmuchof
the subprime mortgage market.31 Piggyback loans,
which had been a popular vehicle in the high LTV
market, also largely disappeared. Finally, banking in 
stitutions may have become less willing to make long 
term investments, including holding new mortgage
loans in portfolio, for a variety of reasons, including
uncertainty about the economic and regulatory envi 
ronment going forward.
In the remainder of this section, we examine the
implications of these market developments in more
detail, focusing on the role of the PMI companies and
the relative pricing of the conventional and noncon 
ventional markets (for more information about PMI,
see box “Private Mortgage Insurance”).
PMI Companies under Strain
PMI companies generally reported large net losses in
2007 and 2008. The Mortgage Insurance Companies
of America (MICA) reports that its members suffered
cumulativeoperatinglossesof over$1.4billionin2007
and $5.8 billion in 2008, compared with operating
income of just over $2 billion in both 2005 and 2006.32
Byearly2009,thestocksof severalof thelargestmort 
gage insurers had lost almost all of their value, and
Standard & Poor’s, a credit rating agency, reported in
mid 2009 that some major mortgage insurers were at
riskof breachingregulatorycapitalthresholdsforwrit 
ing new business.33 Indeed, MICA reports that the
overall risk to capital ratio of its members more than
doubledfrom9to19between2006and2008,approach 
ing the regulatory maximum of 25.34
Mortgage insurers tightened underwriting stan 
dards considerably in 2008 and 2009, especially in
company designated “distressed areas.”35 For in 
stance, in 2009, one major insurer began requiring a
minimum FICO score of 720 in some distressed mar 
kets and 700 in other areas. It also required an LTV
ratio below 90 percent and stopped providing insur 
ance on ARMs with an initial fixed period of less than
fiveyearsinallgeographicareas.Anotherlargeinsurer
in2009raiseditsminimumcreditscoreto680from620
and stopped providing insurance on all manufactured
housing. This company also set a maximum LTV ratio
implemented a risk based insurance system with upfront fees for
30 year mortgages ranging from 1.25 to 2.25 percentage points and
annual premiums from 0 to 0.55 percentage point, depending on the
LTV and credit score of the borrower. The price changes, however,
were rolled back by the Congress, which passed legislation prohibit 
ing the use of a risk based pricing system after October 1, 2008. On
that date, the FHA announced a new fee schedule with an upfront
fee of 1.75 percentage points and an annual premium of 0.55 per 
centage point for 30 year loans with LTVs of 95 percent and higher
and 0.50 percentage point for those with lower LTVs. These prices
prevailedfortherestof 2008andthroughthespringof 2010.During
the period in which the FHA charged risk based rates (and during
the post March fixed rate period), FHA fees were lower than those
for loans purchased by the GSEs with PMI (except for borrowers
with high credit scores).
Overthescopeof ourstudyperiod,theVAchargedanupfrontfee
of 2.15percentagepointsandnoannualpremiumforaveteranusing
the program for the first time with no down payment (the dominant
choice); the fee was reduced to 1.50 percentage points with a 5 per 
cent down payment and to 1.25 percentage points with a down
payment of 10 percent or more. The VA has a streamlined refinance
program that allows the refinancing of a VA loan into another VA
loanwithlittledocumentationandarefinancefeeof 0.50percentage
point(otherrefinanceloanshavethestandardfees).Throughoutthe
study period, the RHS charged a flat upfront fee of 2.00 percentage
points.
29. FICO scores are one summary measure of the credit risk
posed by an individual based solely on the information contained in
the credit reports maintained by the three national credit reporting
agencies. FICO scores are produced using statistical models devel 
oped by Fair Isaac Corporation. A FICO score of 660 or greater is
often viewed as a score range associated with prime quality borrow 
ers; a score less than 620 is often associated with borrowers with
subprimecreditquality.Formoreinformation,seewww.myfico.com/
CreditEducation.
30. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(2010), “Quarterly Report to Congress on FHA Single Family Mu 
tual Mortgage Insurance Fund Programs” (Washington: HUD,
August).Thisreportshowsthatthepercentageof FHAloansissued
toborrowerswithFICOscoresbetween580and620alsofellsharply
in 2009, despite the fact that the FHA did not change its underwrit 
ingstandardsforthisgroup.Thisreductionlikelyreflectstheactions
of lenders who ceased making such loans. Only 6 percent of FHA
borrowersinthefourthquarterof 2009hadaFICOscorebelow620.
31. According to Inside MBS & ABS, no new mortgage backed
securities were issued for subprime or alt A loans or for prime 
qualityjumboloans(loanswithbalancesabovetheconformingloan
limits) in 2009. See Inside Mortgage Finance Publications (2010),
Inside MBS & ABS, June 11, www.imfpubs.com.
32. See Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (2009),
“2009–2010FactBook&MemberDirectory”(Washington:MICA),
available at www.privatemi.com/news/factsheets/2009 2010.pdf.
33. See Standard & Poor’s (2009), “Significant Operating Losses
Continue to Pressure U.S. Mortgage Insurers’ Capital Adequacy
Ratios,” Ratings Direct, August 21, www.standardandpoors.com/
ratingsdirect.
34. One relatively small insurer, Triad Guaranty, was forced to
stop writing new policies in 2008.
35. The list of distressed or declining markets varies by mortgage
insurance company but typically includes metropolitan areas and
states that have experienced severe declines in employment or home
prices.
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other areas during 2009.36
Ananalysisof thePMIdatareportedinconjunction
with the HMDA data documents the extent of the
declineinPMIbylocation(designateddistressedareas
versus all other areas) for loans to purchase site built
one  to four family homes in metropolitan areas
(table 9).37 Although underwriting standards were
tighterindesignateddistressedareasduring2009,PMI
volumeneverthelessfellabout80percent(derivedfrom
data in table 9) relative to 2007 in both types of areas.
The ratio of PMI policies to all loans (the rows labeled
“Market share” in table 9) fell sharply in all areas
36. These are just some of the guidelines issued by these two
companies. Distressed market lists and underwriting guidelines are
generally available on the mortgage insurance companies’ websites.
37. The analysis here is restricted to metropolitan areas since the
HMDA mortgage origination data are more complete in metropoli 
tanareas.WedividedallMSAcountiesintothetwogroupsusingthe
distressed or declining market lists as of early to mid 2009 for three
of the largest PMI companies—Genworth Financial, United Guar 
anty, and Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation. If a county
appeared on at least two of three distressed lists (by virtue of its
being in a designated distressed metropolitan area or state), then we
designated it a distressed county for the analysis. All MSA counties
in some states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan,
New Jersey, and Nevada, were considered distressed. In contrast,




loans required prospective borrowers to make a down
paymentof atleast20percentof ahome’svaluebefore
they would extend a loan to buy a home or refinance
an existing mortgage. Private mortgage insurance




tant to extend mortgages with high loan to value
(LTV) ratios and consumers interested in borrowing
more than 80 percent of the underlying home’s value.
For a borrower seeking a high LTV loan, the lender
can require that the borrower purchase mortgage in 
surance to protect the lender against default related
losses up to a contractually established percentage of
the principal amount. In fact, a high LTV loan must
have PMI coverage in order to be eligible for purchase
bythegovernment sponsoredenterprises(FannieMae
and Freddie Mac). Over the years, PMI backed loans
became a significant part of the mortgage market and
an even more important segment of the insured por 
tion of that market.
PMI Data Reported in Conjunction
with the HMDA Data
In 1993, the Mortgage Insurance Companies of
America asked the Federal Financial Institutions Ex 
amination Council to process data from the largest
PMI companies on applications for mortgage insur 
anceandtoproducedisclosurestatementsforthepub 
licbasedonthedata.1ThePMIdatalargelymirrorthe
types of information submitted by lenders covered by
theHomeMortgageDisclosureActof 1975(HMDA).
However, because the PMI companies do not receive
all the information about a prospective loan from the
lenders seeking insurance coverage, some items re 
ported under HMDA are not included in the PMI
data. In particular, loan pricing information, requests
for preapproval, and an indicator of whether a loan is
subjecttotheHomeOwnershipandEquityProtection




United States, allowing for meaningful analysis of
thesedataalongsidetheHMDAdata.2Still,caremust
be exercised in comparing the PMI and HMDA data.
Specifically, because of lender coverage rules under
Regulation C, the HMDA data may be less compre 
hensive than the PMI data, especially in terms of cov 
erage of rural markets. The PMI reporting firms
provide information on all privately insured loans
regardless of property location. In contrast, HMDA’s
coverage is most complete for metropolitan areas pri 
marily because lenders that maintain offices exclu 
sively in rural areas need not report HMDA data.
For 2009, eight PMI companies reported on nearly
636,000 applications for insurance leading to the issu 
ance of 367,000 insurance policies, down from about
2 million applications and 1.5 million policies in 2007.
About58percentof thepoliciesin2009coveredhome 
purchase loans, and the remainder covered refinance
mortgages. About 12 percent of PMI insurance appli 
cationsweredenied,aratesubstantiallyhigherthanin
2006 and 2007, when only about 2 percent of the
requests for insurance were turned down.3
1. Founded in 1973, the Mortgage Insurance Companies of
America is the trade association for the PMI industry. The Federal
FinancialInstitutionsExaminationCouncil(FFIEC)preparesdisclo 
sure statements for each of the PMI companies. The company state 
ments and the PMI data are available from the FFIEC at
www.ffiec.gov/reports.htm.
2. The PMI data do not capture “pool insurance”—that is, insur 
ancewrittenforpoolsof loansratherthanindividualmortgageloans.
3. For the other applications that did not result in a policy, the
application was withdrawn, the application file closed because it was
not completed, or the request was approved but no policy was issued.
A58 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010(18 percentage points in distressed areas and 22 per 
centage points in other areas).
Consistent with tightening standards, the share of
PMItocoverloansfornon owner occupiedhousing,a
class of loans typically considered to entail elevated
credit risk, fell sharply in both types of geographic
areas. Moreover, these declines exceeded the decline in
the percentage of all loans for non owner occupied
properties (see last column of table 9). Also, the share
of borrowers obtaining PMI with low or moderate
incomes (LMI) or with property in LMI neighbor 
hoods fell substantially.38 Finally, the average ratio of
loan amount to income fell noticeably for loans cov 
ered by PMI.
With PMI companies tightening their underwriting
standards,manyborrowersandlendersseekingahigh 
LTV loan likely turned to the FHA or other govern 
ment loan programs. Nonconventional loans more
than offset the drop in PMI loans in designated dis 
tressed areas, and the nonconventional share of mort 
gages surged from just 6 percent in 2007 to 48 percent
in 2009 in these areas. Despite the drop in PMI issu 
ance, the total fraction of loans insured or guaranteed
through either government or private sources swelled
from 30 percent to 54 percent in designated distressed
areas. This fraction also rose in all other areas, though
notasdramatically.Overall,theuseof mortgageinsur 
ance of one type or another has risen since 2007, espe 
cially in areas designated as distressed by the PMI
companies.
GSE Pricing and the Extension of
Conventional High-LTV Loans
The similar reduction in PMI issuance in both desig 
nated distressed and all other areas suggests that some
factor other than PMI underwriting and pricing
changesmayhavecontributedtothedearthof conven 
tional high LTV loans with PMI in 2009. One impor 
tant determinant of PMI volume is GSE underwriting
and pricing. For instance, loans with LTVs above
95 percent were generally ineligible for GSE purchase
during2008and2009.Therefore,mostborrowersseek 
ing a loan with an LTV in excess of 95 percent were
likely to obtain a nonconventional loan rather than a
38. LMI neighborhoods are census tracts with a median family
income less than 80 percent of the median family income of the
MSA or, for rural areas, the statewide non MSA where the tract is
located. LMI borrowers are those with a reported income less than
80 percent of the median family income of the MSA or statewide
non MSA where the property securing the borrower’s loan is lo 
cated. Borrower income reported in the HMDA data is the total
income relied upon by the lender in the loan underwriting.
9. Patterns of lending for insured or guaranteed loans and for all loans in areas grouped by distressed status,
2007 and 2009
Percent except as noted
Characteristic
Type of loan





2007 2009 Difference 2007 2009 Difference 2007 2009 Difference
Designated as distressed areas
3
Number of loans (thousands)
4 ............ 380 71  309 91 543 452 1,588 1,134  454
Market share.............................. 23.9 6.3  17.6 5.7 47.9 42.2 100.0 100.0 .0
Non owner occupied share ................ 10.1 2.4  7.8 * * * 14.4 10.8  3.6
LMI share
5 ............................... 43.6 30.5  13.1 42.3 50.0 7.7 30.5 41.1 10.5
Mean of loan amount to income (ratio).... 3.3 2.9  .4 3.2 3.2 .0 2.9 2.9 .1
All other areas
3
Number of loans (thousands)
4............. 589 115  474 241 619 378 1,851 1,221  630
Market share.............................. 31.8 9.5  22.4 13.0 50.7 37.7 100.0 100.0 .0
Non owner occupied share ................ 9.3 1.6  7.6 * * * 13.6 8.3  5.4
LMI share
5 ............................... 48.7 29.0  19.7 43.1 52.6 9.6 36.6 43.5 6.9
Mean of loan amount to income (ratio).... 2.7 2.4  .3 2.6 2.8 .2 2.4 2.5 .2
1. See table 3, note 1.
2. Includes insured, guaranteed, and others.
3. For definition of designated distressed areas, see text.
4. Includes first lien, home purchase lending for site built, one  to four family properties located in metropolitan statistical areas.
5. Low  or moderate income (LMI) borrowers have lower income, or the property is in a lower income census tract. Borrower income is the total income relied
upon by the lender in the loan underwriting. Income is expressed relative to the median family income of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or statewide
non MSA in which the property being purchased is located. “Lower” is less than 80 percent of the median. The income category of a census tract is the median
family income of the tract relative to that of the MSA or statewide non MSA in which the tract is located. “Lower” is less than 80 percent of the median.
* Less than 0.5 percent.
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and private mortgage insurance data.
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with relatively low FICO scores, GSE pricing in 2008
and 2009 for loans with LTVs between 80 and 95 per 
cent,regardlessof PMIpricingandunderwritingpoli 
cies,probablymadeFHAandVAloansmoreattractive.
However, for borrowers with moderately high LTVs
(80 percent to 95 percent) and higher FICO scores
(greater than or equal to 700), GSE pricing by itself
would not have discouraged such borrowers from ob 
taining a conventional loan with PMI during 2009.
Therefore,amongborrowerswithhigherFICOscores,
PMI pricing and underwriting could have played an
important role in determining whether these borrow 
ers obtained a conventional loan with PMI.
We compiled data on individual mortgages from
LenderProcessingServices,Inc.(LPS),tocalculatethe
FHA or VA share of first lien home purchase mort 
gage originations by LTV and borrower FICO score.
The LPS data are drawn from the records of 19 large
mortgage servicers, including 9 of the top 10, and
therefore provide detailed information on a large por 
tion of the mortgage market. We report the FHA or
VA share at each LTV from 65 to 100 percent in incre 
ments of 1 percent for borrowers with FICO scores
greater than or equal to 700 (figure 6, top panel).40
Consistent with the conjecture made earlier, nearly all
loans with LTVs over 95 percent were FHA or VA.41
But even in the range just above 90 percent and below
95percent,thevastmajorityof loanswereFHAorVA
despite the GSEs’ favorable pricing for these loans.
Instead, the FHA and VA share falls precipitously
right at 90 percent (along with a spike in volume), and,
overall, only about 30 percent of loans with LTVs
between80and90percentwereFHAorVA.42Because
neither GSE nor FHA or VA pricing changes substan  tively at the 90 percent threshold, PMI pricing and
underwriting may become more favorable at this
threshold, causing the sharp shift away from govern 
ment programs and into the conventional market at
90 percent.
Another downward spike in the nonconventional
share occurs at an 85 percent LTV. Again, this spike
cannot be explained by FHA, VA, or GSE pricing and
thus may be related to PMI policies. Finally, the FHA
and VA share falls to about zero at LTVs of 80 percent
and below, at which points PMI is not required for a
conventional loan.43
Also reported is the FHA and VA share for borrow 
ers with FICO scores less than 700 (figure 6, bottom
panel). In contrast to the top panel, the vast majority
39. Recall that high LTV loans must have PMI in order to be




or sell them on the private secondary market—options that may not
have been as viable in 2009 as they were earlier in the decade.
40. Loanswererestrictedtofirst lien30 yearmortgagesforsingle 
familyowner occupiedpropertiesthatwereoriginatedbetweenMay
andDecemberof 2009.WefocusedontheMaytoDecemberperiod
because the GSEs introduced price changes in April.
41. FHA and VA loans with LTVs reported in the LPS data as
being over 97 percent likely reflect the financing of the upfront
insurance premium.
42. It is important to note that the LPS data are not representa 
tiveandmayoverrepresentnonconventionalandGSElending.Also,
a large number of loans in the LPS data do not have a loan purpose
(home purchase or refinance) reported, and these loans are skewed
toward the conventional market. For these reasons, the FHA or VA
shares reported in figure 6 may be overstated. Although the LPS
data lack the broad coverage of the HMDA data, they have impor 
tant advantages in that they provide much more detailed underwrit 
ing information, such as FICO score and LTV, than do the HMDA
data.
43. Of the loans with LTVs between 80 and 90 percent in the top
panel of figure 6 that were not FHA or VA, just over 94 percent of
them were reported as sold to one of the GSEs. In other words,
nearly all of the non FHA/VA loans in this LTV/FICO cell would






6.   Volume and share of home-purchase loans originated  
       by the Federal Housing Administration and the   
       Department of Veterans Affairs, by loan-to-value ratio,  























FICO scores 700 or above
Loan-to-value ratio (percent)












FICO scores below 700
Loan-to-value ratio (percent)
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on owner-occupied,
single-family, site-built properties with 30-year mortgages. For definition of
FICO score, see text note 29. 
FHA Federal Housing Administration. 
VA Department of Veterans Affairs. 
SOURCE: Lender Processing Services, Inc. 
A60 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010of loans with LTVs over 80 percent were FHA or VA.
Asmentionedearlier,GSEpricingwasunfavorablefor
borrowerswithFICOscoresinthislowerrange,soitis
not surprising that these borrowers obtained noncon 
ventional loans.44
CHANGES IN TOTAL LENDING BY
BORROWER AND AREA CHARACTERISTICS
As discussed earlier, 2008 and 2009 were characterized
bytheincreasedrolesof theFHA,VA,FSA,andRHS
programsandtheGSEs.Thissectionexamineswhether
these changes played out differently across borrower
groups. We differentiate among borrowers by race and
ethnicity, relative income (for both the neighborhood
and the borrower), location (state), type of lender, and
indicators of low quality lending.
Changes in the shares of home purchase and refi 
nance lending from 2006 to 2009 for different groups
are shown (figures 7.A through 7.D). These data indi 
catedifferentpatternsforhome purchaselendingcom 
pared with refinance lending. For example, the shares
of home purchase loans to black and Hispanic white
borrowers decreased over 2008 and 2009, but the de 
crease in these groups’ shares of the refinance market
was more severe. Also, the share of refinance loans to
LMI borrowers fell significantly over the sample pe 
riod, while the share of home purchase loans to such
borrowers increased significantly. Most of this growth
tookplacein2008and2009,whenthefirst timehome 
buyer tax credit program was in place.45
44. The relatively high FHA and VA share of loans with LTVs
below 80 percent in the bottom panel of figure 6 may reflect addi 
tional, unobserved credit risk such as a high debt to income ratio.
The downward spikes in the government backed share at 75 percent
and70percentmaystemfromtheGSEpricingschedule,whichdoes
change at these thresholds for lower score borrowers in 2009.
45. The upward trend in the LMI share of borrowers could
reflect, to some extent, inflated measures of borrower income re 
7.A.   Share of lending extended to minorities, by selected  
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NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on owner-occupied, one-
to four-family, site-built properties and exclude business loans. For definition
of minority, see table 10.A, note 5; for definition of other minority and
explanation of “missing,” see table 10.A, note 6. 
7.B.   Lending extended to borrowers in selected low-income    
          groups as a share of all lending, by type of low-income  





















NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on owner-occupied, one-
to four-family, site-built properties and exclude business loans. Borrower
income is the total income relied upon by the lender in the loan underwriting.
Income is expressed relative to the median family income of the metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) or statewide non-MSA in which the property being
purchased is located. “Lower” is less than 80 percent of the median. The
income category of a census tract is the median family income of the tract
relative to that of the MSA or statewide non-MSA in which the tract is
located. “Lower” is less than 80 percent of the median. “Missing” indicates
that information for the characteristic was missing on the application. “Other”
consists of all non-lower-income and non-missing-income borrowers who are
not in a lower-income census tract. Borrower groups are not mutually
exclusive; therefore, sums do not add to 100 percent. 
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ability Office (GAO) reinforce the view that first time
homebuyers constituted a sizable portion of the 2008
and 2009 home purchase population.46 The GAO re 
ports that there were just over 1 million first time
homebuyer tax credit claims from April through De 
cember of 2008 and just over 1.6 million claims from
January through November of 2009. To help put these
numbers in context, we calculated the number of first 
lien, owner occupied, home purchase originations re 
ported in the HMDA data during these two periods
and inflated these numbers 25 percent to account for
the fact that HMDA does not have universal coverage
of themortgagemarket.Undertheassumptionthatall
first time homebuyers take out a mortgage, these data
imply that first time homebuyers accounted for about
48 percent of the home purchase loans between April
2008 and November 2009.47
Figure 7.C shows trends in three metrics of loan
quality that can be derived from the HMDA data—
the percentage of loans with estimated front end debt 
payment to income (PTI) ratios exceeding 30 percent
(a warning level in underwriting), the percentage of
loans reported as higher priced in the HMDA data,




ported for low  or no documentation loans in 2006 and 2007, thus
biasing downward the LMI share of borrowers in those years.
46. See U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010), Tax Ad-
ministration: Usage and Selected Analyses of the First-Time Home-
buyer Credit (Washington: GAO, September 2), www.gao.gov/
products/GAO 10 1025R.
47. The LPS data shown in figure 6 are also consistent with
first timehomebuyersmakingupalargeshareof thehome purchase
mortgage population. These data indicate that a large share of
home purchase loans had LTVs over 95 percent, which may reflect
high first time homebuyer activity since such borrowers have tradi 
tionally had less money for a down payment.
48. ThemonthlymortgagepaymentusedforthePTIisestimated
assuming all mortgages are fully amortizing 30 year fixed mort 
gages. If the loan pricing spread is reported in the HMDA data, the
loan contract rate is assumed to be the same as the APR. Otherwise,
itisassumedtobeequaltothePMMSAPRlevelplus20basispoints
prevailing at the loan’s estimated lock date.
7.C.   Share of lending, by loan quality and occupancy status    























NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on owner-occupied
(except as noted), one- to four-family, site-built properties and exclude
business loans. A payment-to-income (PTI) ratio is considered high if it
exceeds 30 percent. For definitions of higher-priced lending and PTI, see text.
“Non-owner occupied” includes loans for which occupancy status was
missing. 
7.D.   Share of lending, by location of property securing    























NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first liens on owner-occupied, one-
to four-family, site-built properties and exclude business loans. “Sand states”
consist of California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. “Rust states” consist of
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. “Other” denotes all
remaining states. 
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through 7.C may reflect factors specific to certain geo 
graphic areas rather than factors specific to certain
demographicgroups.Forinstance,adeclineinlending
in California relative to the rest of the nation would
tend to generate a relative decline in lending to His 
panic white borrowers because of the prevalence of
this group in California. As shown in figure 7.D, the
share of loans extended to residents of the “sand
states”—California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada—
declined, particularly for refinance lending. Neverthe 
less, even after controlling for differential trends in
lending across markets, the racial and income trends
described earlier mostly remain (data not shown in
tables).
Borrowers of different demographic groups showed
large differences in their propensity to use different
types of loans, with significant changes from year to
year (tables 10.A and 10.B). All groups showed sub 
stantialincreasesintheiruseof nonconventionalloans
from 2006 through 2009. Black and Hispanic white
borrowers,however,reliedparticularlyheavilyonthese
government programs. In 2009, more than 80 percent
of home purchase loans and more than 50 percent of
refinance loans to black borrowers were nonconven 
tional. For Hispanic white borrowers in 2009, nearly
three fourthsof theirhome purchaseloansand30per 
cent of their refinance loans were nonconventional. In
2006, over 40 percent of home purchase and refinance
loans to both black and Hispanic white borrowers
weresoldintotheprivatesecuritiesmarketorsoldtoa
nongovernment purchaser. By 2007, these shares had
dropped considerably, and the GSE and portfolio
shares of loans among these groups had grown. In
2008 and 2009, the share of home purchase loans to
black and Hispanic white borrowers that were sold to
the GSEs fell, while the share of refinance loans to
bothgroupsthatweresoldtotheGSEsrosefrom2007
through 2009.
Patterns of loan type incidence for LMI borrowers
andborrowerslivinginLMItractsaresimilartothose
for black and Hispanic white borrowers but are more
muted. Loans to these borrowers were less likely to be
soldonthenongovernmentsecondarymarketin2006,
and the shift toward nonconventional loans in 2008
and2009wasnotaslarge.Theshareof borrowerswith
income missing from their loan applications fell from
2006 through 2009 (more than one half of these loans
were sold into the private secondary market in 2006).
The incidence of missing income for refinance loans
actually rose in 2008 and 2009, likely the result of
“streamlined” refinance programs.
In 2006 and 2007, nonconventional loans as well as
GSE loans were significantly less likely than portfolio
or private secondary market loans to be classified as
low quality by our measures—high PTI or higher
priced.However,by2008,thislowerincidenceforhigh 
PTI loans had largely disappeared. The secondary
market for loans reported as higher priced in the
HMDA data appears to have largely disappeared, as
most of these loans ended up in lenders’ portfolios in
2008 and 2009.
Loansoriginatedinthesandstatesin2006and2007
were much more likely to be sold into the private sec 
ondarymarketthanloansoriginatedinotherstates.By
2008, differences in the disposition patterns between
the sand states and the rest of the country had largely
disappeared in the home purchase market, likely in
part because of changes in the FHA and GSE loan
limits. However, in the refinance market, loans origi 








all home lenders with offices in metropolitan areas. As
a consequence of its broad coverage, the HMDA data
canbeusedtoreliablytrackchangesinthestructureof
the mortgage industry and the sources of different
loan products.
Historically,depositoryinstitutions,particularlysav 
ings institutions, were a leading source of mortgage
credit. In 1980, savings institutions extended about
one half of the home loans, and commercial banks
nearly one fourth of such loans.49 As the secondary
market for mortgages evolved, and originating lenders
nolongerneededtoholdloansinportfolio,opportuni 
ties became available for a wider group of lenders to
enter the market and compete with the traditional
types of originating institutions. Mortgage companies
emerged as a major source of loans. Most mortgage
companies are independent of depositories, but some
areaffiliatesordirectsubsidiariesof depositories.Both
types of mortgage companies rely on a wide reaching
base of independent or affiliated brokers to find cus 
tomersandtakeapplications.Bytheearly1990s,mort 
49. See The Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard Univer 
sity (2002), The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment
Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System
(Cambridge, Mass.: JCHS, March).
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loans.50
During the 1980s and through the first half of the
1990s, mortgage companies and depositories largely
competedforborrowersof primeandnear primequal 
ity, with a large proportion of these loans eventually
being purchased or backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Macforsaletoinvestors.Overthenextdecadeorso,as
lenders and investors became more comfortable with
lending to borrowers with weaker credit histories or
other characteristics that signaled elevated credit risk,
the subprime and private securitization markets ex 
panded.
By 2006, mortgage companies, including both inde 
pendentinstitutionsandthoseaffiliatedwithadeposi 
tory institution, originated about 57 percent of all
loans and 72 percent of the higher priced loans
(table 11). As shown in tables 10.A and 10.B, affiliated
mortgage companies tended to sell loans to the GSEs,
whileindependentmortgagecompanieswerethedomi 
nant suppliers of the private secondary market. The
collapse of the subprime market in the first half of
50. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Policy Development and Research, “U.S. Housing Market
Conditions: National Data,” webpage, www.huduser.org/
periodicals/ushmc/fall97/nd_hf.html.
10. Incidence of selected types of loans, by purpose of the loan and by various defining characteristics, 2006–09
A. Home purchase






























2006 2007 2008 2009
Minority status of borrower
5
Black or African American ...... 13.9 16.9 43.2 26.0 21.9 34.2 15.7 28.2 64.0 19.4 5.2 11.4 81.4 9.2 2.6 6.8
Hispanic white .................. 7.0 18.2 46.5 28.3 12.2 37.0 17.2 33.6 51.5 29.5 6.1 13.0 73.6 15.3 4.1 6.9
Asian ........................... 2.7 30.7 33.5 33.1 3.2 43.0 17.1 36.7 14.8 54.8 10.2 20.2 27.3 49.5 9.4 13.9
Non Hispanic white............. 9.6 33.2 27.8 29.4 11.5 44.0 16.2 28.4 35.4 36.2 9.9 18.5 52.1 28.9 7.1 11.9
Other minority or missing
6 ...... 6.2 26.5 35.3 32.0 9.4 41.9 16.9 31.8 33.4 40.4 7.8 18.4 51.3 30.4 6.1 12.3
LMI census tract or borrower
7
Census tract..................... 9.6 22.1 38.9 29.4 13.8 39.0 15.5 31.7 45.5 30.9 7.2 16.5 64.3 20.0 5.2 10.4
Borrower........................ 14.9 30.2 27.6 27.4 15.9 43.0 15.1 26.0 46.1 30.2 8.7 15.0 65.3 20.6 5.3 8.8
Other
8 .......................... 7.7 30.6 32.5 29.2 10.6 42.9 16.5 30.0 33.5 38.6 9.4 18.4 47.2 32.7 7.5 12.6
Missing
9 ........................ 1.7 15.9 41.8 40.7 4.7 29.8 24.1 41.5 37.0 25.4 8.5 29.1 53.3 24.7 5.8 16.2
Loan characteristic or
occupancy status
High payment to income ratio
10 . 5.4 19.3 44.8 30.6 7.5 39.9 19.4 33.3 32.8 38.4 10.9 17.9 54.8 27.3 7.7 10.1
Higher priced
11 ................. .1 5.2 70.9 23.8 .5 27.3 25.6 46.6 10.2 17.3 10.6 61.8 15.5 8.5 5.2 70.8
Non owner occupied
12 .......... .0 30.0 32.3 37.7 .0 42.8 15.7 41.5 .6 53.9 10.4 35.1 .3 56.2 12.0 31.4
Property location
13
Sand states...................... 2.6 19.6 46.2 31.6 6.0 37.1 20.0 36.9 39.8 38.4 8.1 13.7 57.8 27.4 7.3 7.4
Rust states ...................... 9.4 35.1 26.5 29.0 11.3 46.6 13.0 29.1 35.9 35.8 8.2 20.1 50.8 30.8 5.0 13.4
Other ........................... 11.1 30.8 29.4 28.7 13.5 42.6 16.1 27.8 37.2 35.1 9.5 18.2 54.0 27.2 6.7 12.1
Type of lender
Depository...................... 7.5 31.2 19.3 42.0 9.0 41.5 9.0 40.5 30.1 40.7 5.8 23.4 45.7 33.7 4.4 16.2
Affiliate of depository........... 8.9 44.6 31.1 15.4 10.7 57.1 16.0 16.2 35.8 45.5 7.7 11.0 56.2 32.0 4.1 7.7
Independent mortgage company . 10.8 16.1 49.8 23.3 19.0 32.0 33.2 15.8 55.1 20.7 17.2 7.0 69.1 16.0 11.3 3.7
Total............................ 9.0 28.9 32.8 29.4 11.8 42.2 16.4 29.7 37.5 35.8 9.1 17.6 54.4 27.7 6.6 11.3
NOTE: First lien mortgages for owner occupied, one  to four family, site built properties; excludes business loans.
1. See table 3, note 1.
2.Government sponsoredenterprise(GSE)loansarealloriginationscategorizedasconventionalandsoldtoFannieMae,FreddieMac,GinnieMae,orFarmer
Mac.
3. Other loans are conventional loans sold to non government related or non affiliate institutions.
4. Portfolio loans are conventional loans held by the lender or sold to an affiliate institution.
5.Categoriesforraceandethnicityreflectrevisedstandardsestablishedin1997bytheOfficeof ManagementandBudget.Applicantsareplacedunderonlyone
category for race and ethnicity, generally according to the race and ethnicity of the person listed first on the application. However, under race, the application is
designated as joint if one applicant reported the single designation of white and the other reported one or more minority races. If the application is not joint but
morethanoneraceisreported,thefollowingdesignationsaremade:If atleasttwominorityracesarereported,theapplicationisdesignatedastwoormoreminority
races; if the first person listed on an application reports two races, and one is white, the application is categorized under the minority race. For loans with two or
more applicants, lenders covered under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act report data on only two.
6. Other minority consists of American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. “Missing” indicates that information for the
characteristic was missing on the application.
7. See table 9, note 5.
8. Other consists of all non lower  and non missing income borrowers who are not in a lower income census tract.
9. Income was not relied upon in the underwriting of the loan.
10. High payment to income ratio is 30 percent or more.
11. For definition of higher priced lending, see text.
12. Includes loans for which occupancy status was missing.
13.“Sandstates”consistof California,Florida,Arizona,andNevada;“ruststates”consistof Illinois,Indiana,Michigan,Ohio,andWisconsin;“other”consists
of all other states.
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B. Refinance






























2006 2007 2008 2009
Minority status of borrower
5
Black or African American ...... 4.4 16.6 41.2 37.8 10.2 29.3 16.8 43.7 38.9 30.3 4.9 25.9 52.5 31.1 4.3 12.1
Hispanic white .................. 1.8 19.2 43.4 35.6 3.9 34.3 18.7 43.1 19.8 47.4 7.2 25.7 30.1 48.4 7.4 14.1
Asian ........................... .7 24.1 35.5 39.7 1.2 35.7 17.7 45.4 5.4 59.2 10.0 25.4 6.5 70.7 10.1 12.6
Non Hispanic white............. 2.6 27.3 31.2 38.9 4.9 39.5 16.0 39.6 16.0 47.2 9.5 27.3 16.9 58.5 9.7 14.9
Other minority or missing
6 ...... 1.8 21.9 42.6 33.7 4.2 36.4 20.8 38.6 18.9 50.0 7.8 23.3 19.2 58.1 7.2 15.6
LMI census tract or borrower
7
Census tract..................... 2.9 19.5 40.0 37.7 6.2 33.5 17.3 43.0 24.6 40.7 6.8 27.9 31.2 45.9 6.9 16.0
Borrower........................ 2.9 25.5 33.0 38.6 5.7 38.9 15.2 40.2 18.3 44.7 8.2 28.8 16.8 57.4 8.9 16.9
Other
8 .......................... 1.7 25.2 35.3 37.8 3.8 38.3 17.7 40.2 13.3 49.8 9.8 27.0 8.9 64.6 10.7 15.9
Missing
9 ........................ 11.2 21.6 34.6 32.6 17.4 28.6 16.4 37.6 58.7 26.6 2.7 12.0 75.5 19.6 1.4 3.6
Loan characteristic or
occupancy status
High payment to income ratio
10 . .9 16.4 49.5 33.2 2.4 31.9 23.1 42.6 15.7 47.9 10.5 26.0 20.2 56.5 10.6 12.8
Higher priced
11 ................. .1 3.7 60.1 36.1 .2 10.1 27.0 62.6 1.8 9.8 2.9 85.5 8.5 7.9 2.7 80.9
Non owner occupied
12 .......... .1 23.8 36.0 40.0 .1 38.2 17.0 44.6 .9 52.0 8.8 38.3 2.0 61.1 9.3 27.7
Property location
13
Sand states...................... .7 21.5 42.4 35.4 1.6 34.8 20.6 43.0 9.3 56.7 9.7 24.3 14.0 63.3 10.3 12.4
Rust states ...................... 4.0 28.3 29.1 38.6 7.6 40.4 12.8 39.2 19.0 46.0 8.1 26.9 16.9 60.7 7.7 14.7
Other ........................... 3.2 25.2 32.8 38.9 6.0 38.0 16.5 39.5 19.4 44.7 8.9 27.1 20.2 55.2 9.3 15.3
Type of lender
Depository...................... 1.8 26.1 17.4 54.7 3.6 36.2 7.4 52.8 11.4 50.3 5.4 32.9 12.2 63.1 6.5 18.2
Affiliate of depository........... 2.1 38.4 33.3 26.2 3.2 47.3 18.7 30.8 15.5 51.4 8.1 25.0 18.2 67.7 5.1 9.0
Independent mortgage company . 3.6 13.1 57.8 25.4 10.1 31.2 37.7 21.1 38.0 33.7 20.0 8.4 38.6 36.0 18.9 6.5
Total............................ 2.5 24.4 35.3 37.7 5.0 37.5 17.1 40.4 17.6 46.9 8.9 26.6 18.6 57.5 9.2 14.7
NOTE: See notes to table 10.A.
11. Distribution of reported higher priced lending, by type of lender, and incidence at each type of lender, 2006–09





1 New pricing rules
2
Number Distribution Incidence Number Distribution Incidence Number Distribution
2006
Independent mortgage company ..... 1,291,245 45.7 39.2 . . . . . . . . . 3,290,902 31.6
Depository.......................... 801,001 28.4 18.0 . . . . . . . . . 4,459,306 42.9
Affiliate or subsidiary of depository . 731,703 25.9 27.6 . . . . . . . . . 2,649,644 25.5
Total .............................. 2,823,949 100 27.2 . . . . . . . . . 10,399,852 100
2007
Independent mortgage company ..... 307,933 21.1 18.3 . . . . . . . . . 1,683,792 20.4
Depository.......................... 660,518 45.3 14.2 . . . . . . . . . 4,649,803 56.4
Affiliate or subsidiary of depository . 489,927 33.6 25.7 . . . . . . . . . 1,905,246 23.1
Total .............................. 1,458,378 100 17.7 . . . . . . . . . 8,238,841 100
2008
Independent mortgage company ..... 120,605 18.2 9.1 . . . . . . . . . 1,319,714 21.3
Depository.......................... 401,594 60.8 9.9 . . . . . . . . . 4,044,889 65.3
Affiliate or subsidiary of depository . 138,709 21.0 16.8 . . . . . . . . . 826,848 13.4
Total .............................. 660,908 100 10.7 . . . . . . . . . 6,191,451 100
2009
Independent mortgage company ..... 71,679 20.8 4.1 4,088 14.7 1.5 2,026,273 24.2
Depository.......................... 243,974 70.6 5.0 21,957 79.0 3.6 5,499,235 65.8
Affiliate or subsidiary of depository . 29,779 8.6 4.0 1,754 6.3 1.9 832,555 10.0
Total .............................. 345,432 100 4.7 27,799 100 2.9 8,358,063 100
NOTE: First lien mortgages for site built properties; excludes business loans. For definition of higher priced lending, see text.
1. Higher priced loans defined prior to October 1, 2009.
2. Higher priced loans defined on or after October 1, 2009.
... Not applicable.
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diminished the role of mortgage companies. By 2009,
mortgage companies extended only 34 percent of the
loans,withindependentmortgagecompaniesaccount 
ing for about two thirds of this total. The disposition
of loans by affiliates much more closely mirrored that
bydepositories;independentmortgagecompanieswere
still more likely to sell loans into the private secondary
market and showed higher incidence of nonconven 
tional lending than affiliates or depositories
(tables 10.A and 10.B).
Aside from changes in the broad types of lenders
extendingcredit,anotherdevelopmentinthemortgage
market has been an increase in market concentration,
which can be documented using the HMDA data. For
example,the10organizationsthatextendedthelargest
numberof home purchaseloansin1990accountedfor
about 17 percent of all reported loans of this type; in
2009,thelargest10organizationsaccountedfor35per 
cent of the home purchase loans (data not shown in
tables).51 This consolidation is likely driven, at least in
part, by economies of scale in underwriting, loan pro 
cessing,andloanservicing.However,despitethegrow 
ing importance of a relatively few large mortgage
originators, the vast majority of markets (represented
in our analysis by MSAs) remain relatively unconcen 
trated,withprospectiveborrowershavingawiderange
of options.
One widely used metric for the degree of competi 
tion in a local market is the Herfindahl Hirschman
Index (HHI).52 According to merger guidelines from
the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, markets with HHI values less than 1,000
areconsideredunconcentrated,thosewithvaluesfrom
1,000to1,800areconsideredmoderatelyconcentrated,
and those with values above 1,800 are considered con 
centrated. Based on the 2009 HMDA data for home 
purchase lending, 81 percent of 392 MSAs would be
consideredunconcentrated,17percentmoderatelycon 
centrated,and2percentconcentrated(datanotshown
in tables).53 By comparison, in 1990, 60 percent of the
MSAs were unconcentrated, 29 percent moderately
concentrated, and 11 percent concentrated. By this
measure of competition, a larger share of local mar 
kets was unconcentrated or moderately concentrated
in 2009 than in 1990 despite the increase in mortgage
market concentration at the national level.
SUBDUED REFINANCE ACTIVITY IN 2009
As shown earlier in figure 1, the average annual per 
centagerateforaprime quality30 yearfixed ratemort 









sharply from 2001 to 2003, and refinance loan volume
increased to more than 15 million in 2003 (shown ear 
lier in table 2.B), far greater than the refinancing vol 
ume in 2009 of about 5.8 million loans. One possible
reason that refinance activity was not stronger in 2009
is that many of the mortgages available to be refi 
nanced in that year were originated between 2003 and
2005, when interest rates were quite low and therefore
refinancing these loans may not have offered a signifi 
cantenoughbenefittoborrowerstooffsetthetransac 
tion costs.
Other potential obstacles to refinance activity in
2009werehighunemploymentandunderemployment,
as well as severely depressed home values resulting in
low or negative equity positions. From the end of
2006 to the end of 2009, the national unemployment
ratemorethandoubledto10percent,accordingtothe
Bureauof LaborStatistics,andhousepricesfellnearly
11 percent, according to the Federal Housing Finance
Agency(FHFA)homepriceindex.Severalstatesexpe 
rienced deeper home price declines over this period,
most notably the sand states plus Michigan, where the
FHFA index fell more than 20 percent. Many house 
holds may not have been able to refinance to take
advantage of the low rates because they did not have
enough home equity or they did not meet lenders’
income and employment requirements.
We present payoff rates—a rough proxy for refi 
nance rates—during 2009 for 30 year fixed rate con 
ventionalmortgagesactiveasof December2008using
data from LPS (table 12). The loans are divided into
three broad groups: (1) those with a “clean” payment
history (no delinquencies on the mortgage) in the 12
months prior to December 2008 and secured by a
property outside of Arizona, California, Florida,
Michigan,andNevada;(2)thosewithacleanpayment
history in the 12 months prior to December 2008, but
inside Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and
51. For purposes of these calculations, affiliated entities, whether
bankinginstitutionsormortgagecompanies,wereconsolidatedinto
a single organization.
52. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis 
sion (2010), Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Washington: DOJ and
FTC).
53. HHI values were calculated based on 2009 HMDA data for
first lien home purchase loans for site built properties. The analysis
was limited to the data for MSAs because HMDA coverage is most
complete for such areas.
A66 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010Nevada; and (3) those with a “blemished” payment
history (at least one instance of being 30 days or more
in arrears) in the 12monthsprior to December 2008.54
Thesecondgroupcapturesborrowersmostlikelytobe
facing low or negative equity, and the third group cap 
tures distressed borrowers regardless of geographic
location.55 The table disaggregates loans by year of
origination in order to show differences in payoff rates
across years with differing levels of interest rates.
As shown in the bottom row of the table, 65.2 per 
cent of loans in the sample were in the first group,
24.4percentwereinthesecondgroup,and10.4percent
were in the third group. Thus, more than one third of
the loans either had a blemished 12 month payment
history or were in one of the five states that experi 
encedthesharpesthomepricedeclinesfromtheendof
2006 to the end of 2009.
As mentioned earlier, many mortgages were origi 
nated between 2003 and 2005 when rates were quite
low, and thus refinancing these loans in 2009 may not
have offered a significant benefit to borrowers. Focus 
ing just on the first group of loans, in which negative
equity and borrower distress should have been less
common, one can see that a substantial fraction of
loans active as of December 2008 were in fact origi 
nated in the period from 2003 to 2005. Moreover, pay 
off ratesfortheseloanswererelativelylow.Forinstance,
thepayoff rateforthe2005cohort,whichhadamedian
interest rate of 5.875 percent, was 16.2 percent, com 
paredwith23.4percentforloansoriginatedinthenext
year,whichhadamedianinterestrateof 6.5percent.56
Low or negative home equity and the economic
recession may also have muted recent refinance activ 
ity.Consistentwiththisview,theoverallpayoff ratefor
loans in the first group is substantially higher, at about
19 percent, than that for loans in the second and third
groups, at about 13 percent and 4 percent, respec 
tively.57Thesepayoff ratesreflectbothrefinancingand
home sales. Nevertheless, the difference in payoff rates
across the groups likely reflects the difficulties of refi 
nancing for distressed borrowers and borrowers with
low or negative equity. Indeed, the difference in payoff
rates is most pronounced for loans originated in 2006
when interest rates were relatively high. Among loans
54. Loans in the foreclosure process as of December 2008 were
dropped from the analysis sample, which otherwise included all
first lien 30 year mortgages for single family owner occupied prop 
erties in the LPS database that were active as of that date.
55. The LPS data used here do not include updated home values
associated with the mortgages, so it is not possible to determine the
changes in home values for the properties related to the mortgages.
56. Tightened mortgage lending standards, as documented in the
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoan
Survey), is another reason that refinance activity may have been
mutedin2009relativeto2003.Tighterstandardscouldhavedamped
refinance activity even among borrowers in the first group (those
with a clean payment history and outside the five states with steep
homepricedeclines).Theinformationpresentedintable12doesnot
shed light on the extent to which underwriting standards may have
affected refinance activity in 2009.
57. Asubstantialfractionof loansinthethirdgroup(thosewitha
blemished payment history) entered the foreclosure process during
2009. Loans that terminated through foreclosure during 2009 are
notcountedamongtheloansthatwerepaidoff whencalculatingthe
payoff rates in table 12.
12. Mortgage payoff rates during 2009 for loans active as of December 2008, by loan’s payment history, geographic
location, and year of loan origination
Percent
Year of loan origination
1
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1999 or earlier....................... 3.2 7.250 15.5 1.2 7.250 12.0 .8 7.625 5.4 *
2000 ................................ .2 8.125 10.7 .1 8.125 7.9 .1 8.375 1.4 8.1
2001 ................................ 1.5 6.750 19.3 .5 6.875 19.0 .4 7.250 5.8 7.0
2002 ................................ 4.1 6.250 23.7 1.5 6.250 18.4 .6 6.750 4.9 6.5
2003 ................................ 12.0 5.750 17.1 5.5 5.750 14.6 1.3 5.875 5.9 5.8
2004 ................................ 6.9 5.875 17.1 2.6 5.875 11.4 1.0 6.125 3.8 5.8
2005 ................................ 9.3 5.875 16.2 3.8 5.875 9.3 1.7 6.125 3.5 5.9
2006 ................................ 8.8 6.500 23.4 3.0 6.420 9.6 2.0 6.750 3.5 6.4
2007 ................................ 11.2 6.375 21.7 3.6 6.375 11.4 2.2 6.750 3.7 6.3
2008 ................................ 7.7 6.000 19.6 2.7 6.000 17.7 .4 6.500 5.3 6.0
MEMO
All origination years................. 65.2 6.125 19.3 24.4 6.000 12.8 10.4 6.625 4.2 *
NOTE: Loans restricted to 30 year fixed rate conventional first lien mortgages, active as of December 2008, for owner occupied single family homes.
1. Average mortgage interest rate for 30 year fixed rate mortgage reported by Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS).
* Average not calculated because loans span many origination years.
SOURCE: Lender Processing Services.
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group were paid off during 2009, compared with only
9.6 percent of loans in the second group and 3.5 per 
cent in the third group.
PATTERNS OF LENDING IN DISTRESSED
NEIGHBORHOODS
The difficult economic circumstances of the past few
years have not fallen equally across all areas. Housing,
mortgage market, and employment conditions differ
appreciably across regions of the country, submarkets,
andneighborhoods(representedherebycensustracts)
within these broader areas. Some areas have experi 
enced much more distress than others. In some neigh 
borhoods, high levels of distress have persisted for
some time; in others, conditions have recently deterio 
rated.
Concernsaboutcreditconditionsinareasexperienc 
ing high levels of distress have received heightened
attention from policymakers and others. For example,
in June 2010, the federal bank and savings institution
regulatory agencies proposed changes to the rules that
implement the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
tosupportthestabilizationof communitieshithardby
elevated foreclosures.58 The revised regulations would
encourage covered institutions to support the Neigh 
borhood Stabilization Program (NSP), administered
by the Department of Housing and Urban Develop 
ment.59 Under the proposal, lenders would be encour 
aged to make loans and investments and provide
servicesinsupportof NSPactivitiestoindividualsand
neighborhoods beyond the traditional focus of the
CRA, which is on LMI individuals and LMI areas.
Allowing banking institutions to receive CRA consid 
erationforactivitiesconductedinNSP targetedneigh 
borhoods and directed to individuals in such areas
provides additional incentives for these institutions to
leverage government funds targeted to these areas and
populations.
Giventhepublicpolicyfocusonareasindistress,itis
important to learn more about how the changing eco 
nomicconditionshaveaffectedtheavailabilityof mort 
gagecreditindistressedareas.TheHMDAdatacanbe
used to identify differences in the access to and use of
credit along a number of dimensions across census
tractssortedbythedegreeof distresstheyhaveexperi 
enced in their local mortgage market. For the analysis
here,aggregatedcreditrecordinformationprovidedby
Equifax is used to measure the degree of distress a
neighborhood faces. We identify those census tracts
where at least 10 percent of mortgage borrowers had a
loan in foreclosure and designate these tracts as “high 
foreclosure tracts.”60 Over 75 percent of these tracts
are located in the sand states, with Florida alone ac 
counting for almost one half of the tracts.
In 2009, home purchase lending in high foreclosure
tracts, derived from the HMDA data, hovered around
30 percent of its average level in 2004 (figure 8, panel
A). While lending in non high foreclosure (“other”)
tractswasalsodownconsiderablyfrom2004levels,the
declines have not been as severe. This difference is
particularlypronouncedgiventhatlendinginthehigh 
foreclosure tracts was considerably higher in 2005 and
2006 than in these other areas.
A large portion of the difference in home purchase
lending between high foreclosure and other tracts de 
rives from geographic location. The sand states have
beenparticularlyhardhitbythedownturninthehous 
ing market, and, as a result, some of the differences
between the high foreclosure and other tracts repre 
sent market level (MSA) differences. When the distri 
bution of high foreclosure tracts across MSAs is
controlled for (shown by the line labeled “Control”),
home purchase lending levels in the high foreclosure
tractsappeartobeconsistentwiththoseinothertracts
in the same MSAs.
As discussed earlier, borrowers in distressed areas
are less likely to refinance their mortgages. The refi 
nance lending in the high foreclosure tracts was down
substantiallyfromearlieryears(figure8,panelB).This
declinewasmuchmoreseverethanthatexperiencedin
the other tracts or in the control tracts, despite the
58. For more information about the CRA, see Federal Financial
InstitutionsExaminationCouncil,“CommunityReinvestmentAct,”
webpage, www.ffiec.gov/cra. More information about the proposed
revisiontotheCRAisinBoardof Governorsof theFederalReserve
System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision
(2010), “Agencies Propose to Expand Scope of Community Rein 
vestmentActRegulationstoEncourageDepositoryInstitutionSup 
port for HUD Neighborhood Stabilization Program Activities,”
joint press release, June 17, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20100617c.htm.
59. The NSP program allocates funds to local counties and states
with problems arising from the mortgage foreclosure crisis. The
fundsareintendedtoacquire,repair,andresellforeclosedandaban 
doned properties. See U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, “Neighborhood Stabilization Program Resource Ex 
change,” webpage, http://hudnsphelp.info/index.cfm.
60. Equifaxisoneof thethreenationalconsumerreportingagen 
cies. The credit record based data used here include a count within
eachcensustractof thenumberof individualswhohadeitherafirst
mortgage or a home equity loan and a count of the number of
individuals with a record of a foreclosure action as of December 31,
2008. These data included no individually identifying information.
See www.equifax.com for more information about Equifax.
In some cases, a mortgage or record of a foreclosure action may
relate to a property located in a census tract other than the current
residence of the individual, which is how individuals are assigned to
census tracts. Credit records include the address of the individual,
but this address may not be the one of the property associated with
any record of a mortgage.
A68 Federal Reserve Bulletin □ December 2010consistently higher levels of refinance lending in the
high foreclosure tracts from 2005 through 2007.
In spite of the similar patterns in home purchase
lendinginthehigh foreclosureandcontroltracts,some
aspects of lending do appear to differ. For example,
denial rates for home purchase loans, which have been
in decline since peaking in 2007, have been higher,
relative to their 2004 levels, in the high foreclosure
tracts(figure9).Otheraspectsof home purchaselend 
ing in high foreclosure tracts, including the share of
owner occupied properties and the share of loans to
minority borrowers, exhibit similar trends over time as
other tracts, though the absolute levels of activity dif 
fer (data not shown).
A notable difference between the high foreclosure
and control tracts in home purchase lending involves
borrowerincome.Themeanincomeof home purchase
borrowers in high foreclosure tracts, which increased
substantiallyfasterthanmeanincomesin“other”tracts
during 2005 and 2006, has declined significantly faster
thaninthecontroltracts(figure10).Ineachquarterof
2009, the average income of borrowers in the high 
foreclosure tracts was over 10 percent lower than the
mean had been in 2004. Incomes in both “other” and
controltractsalsoexperienceddeclinesandwerebelow
their2004levels,thoughthedeclineswerenotassevere.
The average income of refinance borrowers does not
show a similar pattern; instead, the mean income of
refinanceborrowershasgrownovertime,regardlessof
the level of distress in the tract (data not shown).
Onepossibleexplanationforwhyborrowerincomes
have fallen below their 2004 levels for home purchase
borrowers,butnotrefinancers,maybealargershareof
loanstofirst timehomebuyers.Unfortunately,itisnot
possible to identify first time homebuyers in the
HMDAdata.However,usingasecondsourceof data—
provided by Equifax and composed of individual,
anonymous credit bureau records—we can calculate
the share of all individuals taking out a closed end
mortgage (for any purpose) during each month
8.   Indexed volume of lending, by census-tract group,  






















NOTE: The data are monthly. Loans are first-lien mortgages for site-built
properties and exclude business loans. Index is normalized to 100 for average
monthly lending volume in 2004. For definitions of census-tract groups, see
text. 
9.   Indexed denial rate for home-purchase loans, by census-  












NOTE: See note to figure 8. 
SOURCE: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, data reported
under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 
10.   Indexed average income of borrower, by census-tract  









NOTE: See notes to figure 9. 
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mortgage.61 These data suggest that the share of first 
time homebuyers by this metric, which remained
around 15 percent between 2004 and 2007, increased
sharply beginning in April 2008 to over 20 percent in
late 2008 (figure 11). The share of first time homebuy 
ers again peaked at about 20 percent in 2009.62
A larger share of first time homebuyers may help
explain the observed declines in mean borrower in 
comes beginning in 2008 (both for the whole market
and for high foreclosure tracts). In the case of high 
foreclosuretracts,theincreaseintheshareof first time
homebuyers was particularly steep beginning in April
2008, reaching levels of 40 percent during 2008 (fig 
ure 12). This increase was much larger than that ob 
servedfortheothertracts,thoughsimilartothepattern
observed for the control tracts, suggesting that the
increase was also experienced in “other” tracts in the
same MSAs as the high foreclosure tracts. However,
during 2009, the share of first time mortgage borrow 
ers in high foreclosure tracts remained well above the
levels observed in the other tracts or in the control
tracts. For much of 2009, one third or more of new
mortgage borrowers in high foreclosure tracts were
individuals taking out their first mortgages.
The timing of the increases in the share of first time
homebuyers in April 2008 is consistent with the first 
timehomebuyertaxcredithavingincreasedthenumber
of first time homebuyers. The effect of the first time
homebuyer tax credit may, however, be overstated by
these results. Some of the higher share of first time
homebuyers could be explained by the fact that refi 
nancing activity in these tracts has fallen more rapidly
than has home purchase lending. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to distinguish between refinance loans and
home purchase loans in the Equifax data. In other
words,theincreasingshareof first timehomebuyersis
a function of both the tax credit effect and differential
changes in refinance and home purchase activity. And
itisnotpossibletodeterminetherelativecontributions
of these two factors. Nevertheless, a higher share of
first time homebuying in these tracts offers a reason 
able explanation for the fall in the mean income of
borrowers in high foreclosure tracts.
DIFFERENCES IN LENDING OUTCOMES BY
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND SEX OF THE
BORROWER
Analyses of the HMDA data for each year since pric 
ing data were introduced in 2004 have found substan 
tialdifferencesintheincidenceof higher pricedlending
across racial and ethnic lines—differences that cannot
be fully explained by factors included in the HMDA
data.63 Analyses have also found differences across
61. This second source of data, from Equifax, is a nationally
representative sample of individual credit records, observed quar 
terly from 1999 through 2009. The data set includes a unique se 
quence number that allows us to track individual credit experiences
over time without any personal identifying information. All of the
individuals in our sample remain anonymous.
62. Theshareof first timehomebuyerscalculatedusingthecredit
recorddatadifferssubstantiallyfromtheshareof loanstofirst time
homebuyerscalculatedearlierusingtaxrecorddataandtheHMDA
data for several reasons. These include that the former is a share of
borrowers while the latter is a share of loans. In addition, the loan
purpose, lien status, and occupancy status cannot be easily deci 
phered in the credit record data. As such, the share calculated in this
sectionusingthecreditrecorddataincludesborrowerswhotookout
junior lien loans, loans backed by non owner occupied properties,
or refinance loans and therefore is far lower than the 48 percent of
loans to first time homebuyers cited earlier.
63. See Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “The 2006 HMDA Data”;
Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, “Higher Priced Home Lending and






2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004
NOTE: The data are monthly. For information on data calculation, see text;
also see text notes 61 and 62. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Equifax data. 
12.   Share of first-time borrowers, by census-tract group,  











NOTE: See notes to figure 11. For definitions of census-tract groups, see
text. 
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priced loans, but such differences have generally been
small. Analyses of denial rate data, collected since
1990, have also consistently found evidence of differ 
ences across racial and ethnic groups that cannot be
fullyexplainedbytheinformationintheHMDAdata.
Here, we examine the 2009 HMDA data to determine
the extent to which these differences persist.
Unfortunately, our analysis of the 2009 pricing data
is severely hampered by the introduction of the new
pricing threshold in October 2009 and the significant
variation in the PMMS−Treasury gap over the year,
both of which were discussed earlier. Because the new
and old HMDA reporting rules use different, and
incomparable, thresholds, we conducted a pricing
analysisseparatelyforapplicationsreceivedonorafter
October1,2009,forwhichthenewreportingthreshold
was in place. For comparison purposes, we also con 
ducted an analysis of loans covered under the old
Treasury based threshold rules, but note that for the
reasons discussed earlier, comparison of the two re 
sultsshouldbeviewedwiththeutmostcaution.Unlike
in previous years, we do not report the results of an
analysis of mean APR spreads paid by those with
higher pricedloans,astheincidenceof high ratelend 
ing in 2009 was so low as to make such tests meaning 
less. The data used for the analysis of racial and ethnic
differences in denial rates are unaffected by the prob 
lems with the pricing data, so a meaningful compari 
son can be made with previous years.
The methodology we use for our analysis of both
pricing and denial rates can be described as follows.
Comparisonsof averageoutcomesforeachracial,eth 
nic, or gender group are made both before and after
accounting for differences in the borrower related fac 
tors contained in the HMDA data (income, loan
amount,locationof theproperty(MSA),andpresence
of a co applicant) and for differences in borrower 
relatedfactorsplusthespeci clendinginstitutionused
by the borrower.64 Comparisons for lending outcomes
across groups are of three types: gross (or “un 
modi ed”), modi ed to account for borrower related
factors (or “borrower modi ed”), and modi ed to
account for borrower related factors plus lender (or
“lender modi ed”).65 The analysis distinguishes be 
tween conventional and nonconventional lending, re 
flecting the different underwriting standards and fees
associated with these two broad loan product catego 
ries.66
Incidence of Higher-Priced Lending by Race,
Ethnicity, and Sex
Theportionof the2009HMDAdataforwhichwecan
conduct the most meaningful analysis—applications
covered under the PMMS reporting threshold—
showsverylittlevariationinthefrequencyof reported
higher priced lending across racial and ethnic groups
(tables 13.A, 13.B, 13.C, and 13.D). This result is
driven to a large extent by the fact that the overall
incidence of higher priced lending for all groups is
much lower than it was in earlier years. For example,
we estimated that 22.7 percent of black conventional
refinance borrowers in 2008 paid an interest rate that
was more than 1.75 percentage points above PMMS
prime.67 For loans covered by the new threshold rules,
only 6.3 percent of black conventional refinance bor 
rowers were reported to have had an interest rate
1.50 percentage points above the PMMS prime rate.
The reduction in the incidence is similar for all groups
and all products. Overall, once other factors are ac 
counted for, there are no significant differences in the
incidence of higher priced loans between groups for
loans covered by the new rules.
As noted earlier, we also conducted a pricing analy 
sis for loans covered under the old Treasury based
thresholdreportingrules.Thisanalysis,reportedinthe
first four data columns of table 13, also shows a much
lower incidence of higher priced lending for all groups
than was shown in earlier years. Perhaps as a conse 
quence, pricing disparities among groups, whether
gross or controlling for other factors, are much lower
than estimated in earlier periods. However, as dis 
cussed earlier, the reporting threshold for fixed rate
loans priced in April 2009 or later was much higher
than in previous years. Thus, it is not possible to know
for sure whether the decline in the reported incidence
the2005HMDAData”;andAvery,Canner,andCook,“NewInfor 




and ethnic analyses, and race and ethnicity are controlled for in the
analyses of gender differences. For the analysis of loan pricing for
loans covered under the Treasury based threshold, we control for
whether the loan was priced in the first three months of 2009 versus
the remaining part of the year, since the reporting threshold (under
the old rules) differed so much between these two periods. This
distinctionispossibleonlybecausewehaveaccesstotheinformation
on application and action dates, which are not publicly available.
65. For purposes of presentation, the borrower  and lender 
modi ed outcomes shown in the tables are normalized so that, for
the base comparison group (non Hispanic whites in the case of com 
parisonbyraceandethnicityandmalesinthecaseof comparisonby
sex), the mean at each modi cation level is the same as the gross
mean.
66. Although results are reported for nonconventional lending as
a whole, the analysis controls for the specific type of loan program
(FHA, VA, or FSA/RHS) that was used.
67. See Avery and others, “The 2008 HMDA Data: The Mort 
gage Market during a Turbulent Year,” in note 14.
The 2009 HMDA Data: The Mortgage Market in a Time of Low Interest Rates and Economic Distress A7113. Incidence of higher priced lending, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race,
ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 2009
A. Home purchase, conventional loan
Percent except as noted
























1 New pricing rules
2
Race other than white only
3
American Indian or Alaska Native... 3,519 7.2 5.5 7.7 502 3.6 4.2 3.3
Asian ............................... 52,420 2.5 3.9 5.0 11,291 .9 2.5 3.0
Black or African American .......... 21,178 7.3 6.8 7.6 3,220 3.4 3.7 3.8
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 3,093 3.1 4.7 5.3 386 2.1 4.4 4.5
Two or more minority races.......... 498 3.8 5.0 5.7 71 .0 2.2 .6
Joint ................................ 13,560 2.8 3.7 5.0 2,089 1.5 2.8 3.3
Missing ............................. 74,943 2.4 3.1 5.1 12,632 .9 2.1 3.1
White, by ethnicity
3
Hispanic white ...................... 37,725 7.9 6.2 6.4 5,948 6.3 4.4 3.8
Non Hispanic white................. 393,916 4.9 4.9 4.9 81,537 3.2 3.2 3.2
Sex
One male............................ 171,398 5.0 5.0 5.0 34,584 2.9 2.9 2.9
One female.......................... 128,179 4.4 4.3 4.7 25,707 2.5 2.5 2.7
Two males........................... 11,970 5.4 5.4 5.4 1,769 4.4 4.4 4.4
Two females......................... 9,411 3.8 4.3 5.9 1,373 3.3 3.1 1.9
NOTE: First lien mortgages for owner occupied, one  to four family, site built properties; excludes business loans. For definition of higher priced lending and
explanationsof oldandnewpricingrulesandmodificationfactors,seetext.Loanstakenoutjointlybyamaleandfemalearenottabulatedherebecausetheywould
not be directly comparable with loans taken out by one borrower or by two borrowers of the same sex.
1. See table 11, note 1.
2. See table 11, note 2.
3. See table 10.A, note 5.
13. Incidence of higher priced lending, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race,
ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 2009
B. Refinance, conventional loan
Percent except as noted
























1 New pricing rules
2
Race other than white only
3
American Indian or Alaska Native... 10,978 6.9 6.2 4.7 1,398 2.7 2.6 1.7
Asian ............................... 88,310 1.5 2.9 3.8 16,982 .6 2.2 2.6
Black or African American .......... 70,486 9.0 8.5 6.2 9,554 6.3 6.0 3.7
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 9,207 3.5 4.8 3.6 1,113 1.3 2.3 2.7
Two or more minority races.......... 2,000 1.4 3.4 1.7 245 .8 6.4 4.3
Joint ................................ 43,100 2.7 3.0 3.3 6,219 1.4 2.0 2.9
Missing ............................. 245,310 2.5 2.9 4.0 38,810 1.1 2.0 2.7
White, by ethnicity
3
Hispanic white ...................... 88,837 6.5 5.2 4.9 12,768 4.8 3.6 3.3
Non Hispanic white................. 955,406 5.1 5.1 5.1 191,459 2.8 2.8 2.8
Sex
One male............................ 357,819 4.8 4.8 4.8 64,520 2.5 2.5 2.5
One female.......................... 303,443 3.8 4.4 4.4 53,489 3.2 2.6 2.5
Two males........................... 27,757 2.8 2.8 2.8 3,466 2.1 2.1 2.1
Two females......................... 28,789 3.4 2.7 2.9 3,623 2.6 1.8 1.5
NOTE: See notes to table 13.A.
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ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 2009
C. Home purchase, nonconventional loan
Percent except as noted
























1 New pricing rules
2
Race other than white only
3
American Indian or Alaska Native... 7,059 5.2 4.7 5.3 1,024 .6 .8 1.5
Asian ............................... 23,449 4.6 4.6 5.4 4,490 .8 1.2 1.3
Black or African American .......... 61,000 7.9 6.9 7.5 12,520 2.2 2.3 2.0
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 4,927 5.6 5.8 6.8 710 .7 .6 .7
Two or more minority races.......... 801 4.4 4.1 4.6 120 .8 .6  .2
Joint ................................ 15,731 4.3 5.5 6.2 2,332 .7 1.5 1.0
Missing ............................. 65,714 5.3 5.5 5.8 12,139 1.0 1.1 1.1
White, by ethnicity
3
Hispanic white ...................... 66,431 7.9 5.8 6.2 13,330 1.4 1.6 1.1
Non Hispanic white................. 327,069 5.3 5.3 5.3 78,296 1.1 1.1 1.1
Sex
One male............................ 179,507 5.9 5.9 5.9 42,427 1.3 1.3 1.3
One female.......................... 127,108 6.6 5.5 5.8 29,774 1.5 1.1 1.0
Two males........................... 16,864 7.3 7.3 7.3 2,584 1.1 1.1 1.1
Two females......................... 13,476 7.2 6.5 7.1 2,000 1.3 1.1 1.5
NOTE: See notes to table 13.A.
13. Incidence of higher priced lending, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race,
ethnicity, and sex of borrower, 2009
D. Refinance, nonconventional loan
Percent except as noted
























1 New pricing rules
2
Race other than white only
3
American Indian or Alaska Native... 3,868 5.0 7.1 6.2 408 4.4 5.1 4.1
Asian ............................... 10,449 5.4 5.8 6.5 1,642 3.2 3.2 1.8
Black or African American .......... 57,330 9.1 9.5 8.9 8,750 5.9 4.0 .9
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 2,867 4.3 5.9 6.5 358 3.1 2.8 4.8
Two or more minority races.......... 586 3.1 2.7 5.0 74 9.5 .9 .0
Joint ................................ 12,588 5.0 6.8 7.6 1,753 2.1 3.9 .6
Missing ............................. 69,924 8.4 8.8 7.5 9,547 1.9 1.7 .0
White, by ethnicity
3
Hispanic white ...................... 35,824 7.8 7.6 7.1 5,874 5.2 3.0 .0
Non Hispanic white................. 292,529 7.8 7.8 7.8 53,931 4.8 4.8 4.8
Sex
One male............................ 135,396 7.8 7.8 7.8 23,718 4.0 4.0 4.0
One female.......................... 97,662 9.7 8.0 8.4 17,070 7.6 5.8 6.1
Two males........................... 8,284 7.4 7.4 7.4 1,226 2.0 2.0 2.0
Two females......................... 8,739 7.9 7.2 5.2 1,032 2.6 1.8 .2
NOTE: See notes to table 13.A.
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ing or a higher reporting threshold (although the re 
ported incidence is also lower than in previous years in
the first three months of 2009, when a much lower
reportingthreshold applied).Consequently,great cau 
tion should be exercised in drawing any meaningful
inference about disparities in pricing across racial and
ethnic groups from this portion of the analysis.
With regard to the sex of applicants, no notable
differences are evident for either conventional or non 
conventional lending or for either of the threshold
rules.
Denial Rates by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex
Analyses of the HMDA data from earlier years have
consistently found that denial rates vary across appli 
cantsgroupedbyraceorethnicity.In2009,asinearlier
years, for both home purchase and refinance conven 
tional and nonconventional lending, black and
Hispanic white applicants had notably higher gross
denial rates than non Hispanic white applicants
(tables 14.A, 14.B, 14.C, and 14.D). The pattern for
Asian applicants is similar but much more muted.
Denialratesforallgroupsshowmodestdecreasesfrom
2008 to 2009. For refinance loans, denial rates are
down more substantially from 2008 but still remain
muchhigherthanratesforcomparablehome purchase
applicants.Forexample,almostone half of blackcon 
ventionalrefinanceapplicantsweredenied,versusonly
one third of black conventional home purchase appli 
cants. There is no consistent pattern between conven 
tional and nonconventional lending. Non Hispanic
white conventional and nonconventional home 
purchase applicants were denied at about the same
rate;nonconventionalrefinanceapplicantsof thesame
group were denied at a much higher rate than conven 
tional refinance applicants. Black applicants, however,
consistently showed lower denial rates for nonconven 
tional loans than for comparable conventional loans.
Controlling for borrower related factors in the
HMDA data reduces the differences among racial and
ethnic groups. Accounting for the speci c lender used
by the applicant reduces differences further, although
unexplaineddifferencesremainbetweennon Hispanic
whites and other racial and ethnic groups. Overall,
with the exception of the disparity between black and
non Hispanic white applicants for conventional refi 
nance loans, unexplained differences are modestly re 
duced from 2008. With regard to the sex of applicants,
no notable differences are evident for either conven 
tional or nonconventional lending.
14. Denial rates on applications, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race and ethnicity,
and sex of applicant, 2008−09
A. Home purchase, conventional loan application
Percent except as noted





























Race other than white only
1
American Indian or Alaska Native... 9,939 29.7 24.6 21.0 6,677 27.7 22.6 20.4
Asian ............................... 152,213 18.7 16.6 16.8 160,900 16.6 15.6 15.5
Black or African American .......... 105,001 36.1 29.7 25.4 50,667 32.3 27.4 24.1
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 8,016 26.9 22.7 21.0 5,335 24.1 19.9 17.6
Two or more minority races.......... 1,669 23.6 21.9 23.8 925 26.9 18.0 18.8
Joint ................................ 28,195 14.8 17.6 15.3 25,300 13.2 15.2 14.0
Missing ............................. 220,395 21.5 19.9 17.0 182,358 19.1 17.5 15.4
White, by ethnicity
1
Hispanic white ...................... 160,823 31.1 22.7 22.0 90,662 25.6 19.7 19.0
Non Hispanic white................. 1,425,869 13.6 13.6 13.6 1,159,857 13.1 13.1 13.1
Sex
One male............................ 640,030 21.3 21.3 21.3 481,586 18.0 18.0 18.0
One female.......................... 443,753 19.8 19.4 19.9 336,677 16.9 16.1 16.6
Two males........................... 25,195 21.1 21.1 21.1 21,092 20.2 20.2 20.2
Two females......................... 19,148 20.4 19.3 19.6 15,684 19.1 17.6 17.5
NOTE: First lien mortgages for owner occupied, one  to four family, site built properties; excludes business loans. For explanation of modification factors, see
text.Applicationsmadejointlybyamaleandfemalearenottabulatedherebecausetheywouldnotbedirectlycomparablewithapplicationsmadebyoneapplicant
or by two applicants of the same sex.
1. See table 10.A, note 5.
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and sex of applicant, 2008−09
B. Refinance, conventional loan application
Percent except as noted





























Race other than white only
1
American Indian or Alaska Native... 36,265 65.4 56.7 43.0 29,013 44.1 40.4 36.5
Asian ............................... 150,970 31.6 35.4 36.1 398,222 22.8 24.8 24.3
Black or African American .......... 343,389 61.2 59.9 44.9 268,726 49.8 44.7 38.3
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 19,275 51.8 52.2 43.4 23,332 38.8 36.4 32.1
Two or more minority races.......... 4,682 50.5 49.7 42.0 4,660 41.8 42.6 33.1
Joint ................................ 53,200 41.8 46.0 36.8 114,738 23.4 27.6 25.2
Missing ............................. 532,425 41.5 42.5 37.8 964,105 28.9 29.1 25.5
White, by ethnicity
1
Hispanic white ...................... 320,845 50.6 45.3 41.3 323,805 41.0 33.0 30.1
Non Hispanic white................. 2,894,154 31.7 31.7 31.7 5,726,883 21.0 21.0 21.0
Sex
One male............................ 1,125,624 41.5 41.5 41.5 1,621,336 29.6 29.6 29.6
One female.......................... 889,334 40.7 39.0 39.6 1,291,103 28.4 27.1 27.5
Two males........................... 32,014 38.2 38.2 38.2 59,147 27.1 27.1 27.1
Two females......................... 35,706 41.7 38.5 36.9 59,281 26.8 26.0 26.7
NOTE: See notes to table 14.A.
14. Denial rates on applications, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race and ethnicity,
and sex of applicant, 2008−09
C. Home purchase, nonconventional loan application
Percent except as noted





























Race other than white only
1
American Indian or Alaska Native... 10,154 19.7 20.6 18.6 13,392 18.5 19.4 18.5
Asian ............................... 26,711 21.3 19.2 18.6 49,739 18.5 17.7 16.8
Black or African American .......... 161,187 25.0 24.0 22.6 161,885 23.1 21.8 20.6
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 6,581 21.7 18.9 18.3 8,267 19.8 16.3 17.4
Two or more minority races.......... 1,141 23.8 23.3 17.3 1,282 21.5 21.2 19.5
Joint ................................ 25,123 14.7 16.2 16.3 28,304 13.7 14.5 13.9
Missing ............................. 121,400 21.9 20.8 19.8 161,196 19.3 18.6 17.2
White, by ethnicity
1
Hispanic white ...................... 152,228 24.0 19.8 20.0 198,875 21.4 17.5 17.6
Non Hispanic white................. 890,659 14.1 14.1 14.1 1,155,799 13.1 13.1 13.1
Sex
One male............................ 433,829 19.0 19.0 19.0 590,855 16.9 16.9 16.9
One female.......................... 283,404 19.2 17.7 17.8 409,757 16.4 15.7 15.8
Two males........................... 29,772 20.9 20.9 20.9 30,976 21.1 21.1 21.1
Two females......................... 23,519 20.5 18.7 18.5 23,212 20.5 18.5 19.8
NOTE: See notes to table 14.A.
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Fair Lending Compliance
In interpreting the findings in this section, it is impor 
tanttonotethatbothpreviousresearchandexperience
gained in the fair lending enforcement process show
that differences in loan outcomes among racial or eth 
nicgroupsstem,inpart,fromcredit relatedfactorsnot
available in the HMDA data, such as measures of
credit history (including credit scores), LTV and PTI,
anddifferencesinchoiceof loanproducts.Differential
costs of loan origination and the competitive environ 
ment also may bear on the differences in pricing, as
may differences across populations in credit shopping
activities. It is also important to note that the absence
of the finding of disparities in pricing across groups
does not mean that such disparities do not exist; the
reportingthresholdforpricingunderHMDAmaysim 
ply have been set too high to detect them.
Differences in pricing and underwriting outcomes
mayalsore ectdiscriminatorytreatmentof minorities
or other actions by lenders, including marketing prac 
tices. The HMDA data are regularly used to facilitate
the fair lending examination and enforcement pro 
cesses. When examiners for the federal banking agen 
cies evaluate an institution’s fair lending risk, they
analyze HMDA price data in conjunction with other
information and risk factors, as directed by the Inter 
agency Fair Lending Examination Procedures.68
68. The Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures are
available at www.ffiec.gov/PDF/fairlend.pdf.
14. Denial rates on applications, unmodified and modified for borrower  and lender related factors, by race and ethnicity,
and sex of applicant, 2008−09
D. Refinance, nonconventional loan application
Percent except as noted





























Race other than white only
1
American Indian or Alaska Native... 5,229 49.7 49.6 43.6 8,946 39.1 37.3 35.0
Asian ............................... 11,836 51.5 49.0 45.1 28,290 41.3 36.4 34.0
Black or African American .......... 155,665 45.0 47.2 46.1 203,611 38.1 39.7 37.5
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific
Islander .......................... 3,643 49.7 47.7 47.2 6,589 38.2 32.9 35.4
Two or more minority races.......... 873 58.2 59.7 53.1 1,491 47.4 44.4 36.7
Joint ................................ 14,154 38.7 44.1 42.2 28,105 27.2 33.0 32.5
Missing ............................. 165,776 54.6 47.7 43.9 236,542 44.6 40.1 32.6
White, by ethnicity
1
Hispanic white ...................... 73,118 47.6 44.1 44.3 116,354 37.1 35.3 34.4
Non Hispanic white................. 662,593 37.5 37.5 37.5 1,157,984 29.9 29.9 29.9
Sex
One male............................ 300,070 42.8 42.8 42.8 477,570 34.2 34.2 34.2
One female.......................... 219,503 44.0 41.2 41.3 345,310 36.0 32.8 33.0
Two males........................... 11,826 41.8 41.8 41.8 17,944 30.6 30.6 30.6
Two females......................... 13,808 41.2 40.3 40.3 19,001 34.3 31.7 30.8
NOTE: See notes to table 14.A.
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REGULATION C
The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation C requires
lenders to report the following information on home 
purchase and home improvement loans and on
re nancing loans:
For each application or loan
v application date and the date an action was taken on
the application
v action taken on the application
— approved and originated
— approved but not accepted by the applicant
— denied (with the reasons for denial—voluntary
for some lenders)
— withdrawn by the applicant
—  le closed for incompleteness
v preapproval program status (for home purchase
loans only)
— preapproval request denied by financial institu 
tion





— insured by the Federal Housing Administration
— guaranteed by the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs










v type of purchaser (if the lender subsequently sold






— Commercial bank, savings bank, or savings asso 
ciation
— Life insurance company, credit union, mortgage
bank, or finance company
— Affiliate institution
— Other type of purchaser




v income relied on in credit decision
For each property
v location, by state, county, metropolitan statistical
area, and census tract
v type of structure
— one  to four family dwelling
— manufactured home
— multifamily property (dwelling with  ve or more
units)
v occupancystatus(owneroccupied,non owneroccu 
pied, or not applicable)
For loans subject to price reporting
v spreadabovecomparableTreasurysecurityforappli 
cations taken prior to October 1, 2010
v spread above average prime offer rate for applica 
tions taken on or after October 1, 2010
For loans subject to the Home Ownership
and Equity Protection Act
v indicator of whether loan is subject to the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act [
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